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ABSTRACT
This Article offers a novel doctrinal resolution of the key issues in Fisher v. Texas, the impending
Supreme Court case which involves race-conscious admissions policies at the University of Texas at
Austin (“UT”). The resolution proposed here addresses Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concerns about
race-conscious policies, but also preserves most of the Court’s 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger ruling,
in spite of the fact that Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter. Substantively, the Article clarifies
the key issues in Fisher (the meaning of “critical mass” and the scope of deference that courts give
to universities) by focusing on a simple idea that permeates Grutter and Fisher but has not been
analyzed in the scholarly literature to date: the significance of diversity within racial groups. It
argues that under Grutter, a race-conscious policy can aim not only to increase minority
representation overall, but also to increase diversity within racial groups. Moreover, the Article
contends that diversity within racial groups is key to understanding the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions policies for several reasons: 1. Within-group diversity elucidates clearly how
a “critical mass” of minority students is different from numerical goals and quotas; 2. Withingroup diversity directly reflects the compelling interest in educational diversity at the classroom
level that was articulated in Grutter—the breakdown of racial stereotypes and the facilitation of
cross-racial understanding through admission of a “critical mass”; 3. A holistic admissions policy
that emphasizes within-group diversity reduces the stigmatic harm of race-conscious measures; and
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4. Attaining diversity within racial groups necessitates a degree of deference to universities in their
admissions policies. Nevertheless, after reviewing the basic substantive issues in Fisher, the
Article also illustrates how the Fifth Circuit could have been less deferential to UT in its Fisher
ruling. It distinguishes between three different categories of deference to universities—
implementation of race-conscious policies, educational objectives related to racial diversity, and
need for race-conscious policies—and analyzes the appropriate standard of review for each. The
third category, need for race-conscious policies, is the issue at play in Fisher, and the Article
contends that Justice Kennedy’s view on this issue will be outcome determinative in Fisher. The
Article then proposes a different analysis to decide Fisher—the “unique contribution to diversity”
test—which focuses on within-group diversity and applies strict scrutiny rather than the “good
faith” standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit. These distinctions are directly reflective of the
concerns raised in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent. Finally, the Article highlights a key values
conflict that Justice Kennedy will face when deciding Fisher: the tension the case presents between
diversity in higher education and racial segregation in K-12 schooling.

INTRODUCTION
1

In 2013, when it rules in the case of Fisher v. Texas, the United
States Supreme Court will revisit one of the most contentious issues it
has decided in recent decades: the constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions policies in higher education. In 2003, a fractured Court
2
upheld such policies in Grutter v. Bollinger, with a 5-4 majority opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. While Grutter was
clear in its approval of race-conscious policies to pursue educational
diversity as a compelling interest, it left open some contentious questions: the meaning of a “critical mass” of minority students and the
scope of deference given to universities regarding the use of raceconscious policies. These will be the key issues as the Court decides
Fisher and determines the constitutionality of the University of Texas
at Austin’s (“UT”) undergraduate admissions policy.
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s swing vote will likely be outcome3
determinative in Fisher. Justice Kennedy dissented from the holding
1

2
3

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21, 2012).
Oral arguments in Fisher occurred on October 10, 2012. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (2012) (No. 11-345).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Justice Elena Kagan has recused herself from Fisher because of her role in the case, as Solicitor General, when it was still in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Based on their prior jurisprudence, Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, along with Chief Justice Roberts, will likely vote to overrule the Fifth CirCircuit in Fisher, and to substantially curb or even overturn Grutter. See generally Grutter,
539 U.S. at 346–87 (Scalia, J. dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing disdain for
the Grutter majority’s approval of race-conscious admissions policies); Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (striking down a race-conscious
admissions policy). Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor
will likely vote to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher ruling, or at least to keep Grutter intact.
See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311–45 (majority opinion upholding race-conscious admissions policy joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg); Charlie Savage, Videos Shed New
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4

in Grutter, but he did not completely rebuff the use of race as an ad5
missions factor; moreover, his race and equal protection jurispru6
dence has been evolving over time. So the overarching question in

4

5

6

Light on Sotomayor’s Positions, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A17, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/politics/11judge.html (noting that Justice Sotomayor “once described herself as ‘a product of affirmative action’” and “thought it was
‘critical that we promote diversity’”). If Justice Kennedy votes with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, the Court would vote to a 4-4 tie and automatically affirm the Fifth
Circuit opinion in Fisher. Thus, Justice Kennedy’s resolution of the case will be key. See
also Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of the Middle Ground,
107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 74, 77 (2012) (noting that when the Supreme Court decides Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., “Justice Kennedy’s vote would carry the day regardless of
whether Kagan participates in the case”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The question presented to the Supreme Court in Fisher is narrowly framed to include Grutter as precedent: “Whether this
Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), permit the University of Texas at
Austin’s use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions.” See Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at i, Fisher, No. 11-345, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/1100345qp.pdf. Thus, Justice Kennedy and the Court might not reconsider Grutter itself,
but just aim to clarify it.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve
diversity . . . .”). Moreover, although Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter, he did agree
with the Grutter majority’s affirmance of Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (“The opinion by Justice Powell, in my view, states the correct rule for deciding the case . . . . Justice Powell’s approval of the use of race in university admissions
reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university’s
conception of its educational mission.”). In Bakke, four Justices voted to strike down the
University of California at Davis Medical School special admissions program, which set
aside sixteen of one hundred spots in each admitted class for members of minority
groups, and four Justices voted to uphold the admissions policy. 438 U.S. at 272, 275,
320, 325–26. Justice Powell voted to strike down the UC Davis program, but wrote that
race could be used as a “plus” factor for achieving the compelling state interest of diversity in education. Id. at 317 (Powell, J., concurring) (affirming the constitutionality of “an
admissions program[,] [where] race or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a
particular applicant’s file . . . [but] does not insulate the individual from comparison with
all other candidates for the available seats”). Justice Powell’s concurring opinion was cited as support for this proposition in Grutter. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307 (“[T]he Court
endorses Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest in
the context of university admissions.”).
See Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 104, 130 (2007) (noting that “Justice Kennedy’s opinions in LULAC and Parents Involved invite us to abandon our monolithic stories about race and think about equal protection in domain-centered terms”). See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion recognizing the interests of different Latino groups in political representation); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation . . . .”). Professor Gerken also observes that in Parents
Involved, “Justice Kennedy . . . makes a remarkably similar argument [to Justice
O’Connor’s argument in Grutter]. . . , even observing that public schools could use a Grut-
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Fisher is how much, if at all, will Justice Kennedy curb the use of race7
conscious policies? And the answer to this question depends on Justice Kennedy’s view of the two key issues in Fisher: critical mass and
deference.
This Article offers a novel doctrinal resolution of the key issues in
Fisher—a resolution which preserves the Grutter holding but also addresses the concerns in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent. The Article
clarifies the meaning of “critical mass” and the scope of deference
given to universities by focusing on a simple idea that permeates Grutter and Fisher but which has not been explicated to date: the signifi8
cance of diversity within racial groups. It argues that a race-conscious

7

8

ter-like admissions policy as a last resort.” Gerken, supra note 6, at 117. See also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A] district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student
population. Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.”).
Other commentators also note that Justice Kennedy probably will not completely preclude the use of race in admissions. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox:
Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
113, 117 (2012) (noting that in Fisher, “the decisive vote of Justice Anthony Kennedy . . . likely will preclude repudiation of Grutter’s central holding”); Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Is Affirmative Action in College Admissions Doomed?, HUFFPOST COLLEGE (Feb.
23, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lyle-denniston/affirmativeaction_b_1294671.html (“Looking back to what Kennedy wrote in dissent in 2003, he recalled with approval Justice Powell’s view that a university admissions program ‘may take
account of race as one, nonpredominant factor in a system designed to consider each applicant as an individual’. . . . Justice Kennedy has been somewhat more flexible on race issues than some of his conservative colleagues, and he may not yet be ready to cast aside
altogether the use of race as ‘one, nonpredominant factor.’”). Some commentators have
also contended that Justice Kennedy will very likely narrow the scope of race-conscious
admissions in Fisher. See Rostron, supra note 3, at 78 (contending that in Fisher, “the most
likely outcome is that Kennedy will . . . refus[e] to put a complete stop to affirmative action, but insist[] . . . that rigorous strict scrutiny really and truly will apply”); see also
Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases? Fisher v.
University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC. 77, 88 (2012) (contending that “the most likely Fisher result is . . . [one in which]
[t]he window for race-based affirmative action in higher education will be narrowed, but
left ever-so-slightly open” (footnote omitted)).
This Article will use the phrases “diversity within racial groups” and “within-group diversity” interchangeably. “Intra-racial diversity” and “intra-group diversity” are also synonymous terms. All of these terms refer to the variety of viewpoints and experiences that exist among members of the same racial group. It should be noted that while the
implications of within-group diversity for the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions have not been considered, there has been scholarly attention to within-group diversity in admissions from a social justice perspective. For example, Professors Kevin Brown
and Jeanine Bell advocate for universities to distinguish between different Black groups,
such as Black immigrants (from Africa and the Caribbean), multiracial persons, Black Latinos, and African Americans, when implementing their race-conscious admissions policies. See Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and
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policy can aim not only to increase minority representation overall,
but also to increase diversity within racial groups—a point which has
not been analyzed in scholarly discourse on Grutter or Fisher. Moreover, the Article contends that diversity within racial groups is key to
understanding the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies for several reasons: 1. Within-group diversity elucidates how a
critical mass of minority students is different from numerical goals
and quotas; 2. Within-group diversity directly reflects the compelling
interest in educational diversity at the classroom level that was articulated in Grutter—the breakdown of racial stereotypes and the facilitation of cross-racial understanding through admission of a critical
mass; 3. A holistic admissions policy that emphasizes within-group diversity reduces the stigmatic harm of race-conscious measures; and 4.
Attaining diversity within racial groups necessitates a degree of deference to universities in their admissions policies. Nevertheless, after
9
reviewing the basic substantive issues in Fisher, the Article also illustrates how the Fifth Circuit could have been less deferential to UT in
its Fisher ruling, and it proposes a different method for resolving the
case.

9

the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational Institutions,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1231 (2008) (questioning admissions policies “that lump[] all
blacks into a single-category approach that pervades admissions decisions of so many selective colleges, universities, and graduate programs”). Professors Brown and Bell further
note that given “the growing percentage of blacks with a white parent and foreign-born
black immigrants and their sons and daughters” at selective institutions, “blacks whose
predominate racial and ethnic heritage is traceable to the historical oppression of blacks
in the U.S. are far more underrepresented than administrators, admissions committees,
and faculties realize.” Id. See also Kevin Brown, Should Black Immigrants Be Favored Over
Black Hispanics and Black Multiracials in the Admissions Processes of Selective Higher Education
Programs?, 54 HOW. L.J. 255, 302 (2011) (arguing that “admissions committees of selective
higher education institutions should not provide treatment that is more favorable to
Black Immigrant applicants”). Professors Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier have
raised similar concerns. See Cara Anna, Immigrants among blacks at colleges raises diversity
questions, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/
education/higher/articles/2007/04/30/immigrants_among_blacks_at_colleges_raises_
diversity_questions/?page=2 (“The issue of native vs. immigrant blacks took hold at Harvard in 2004, when professors Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier pointed out at a black
alumni reunion that a majority of attendees were of African or Caribbean origin.”).
This Article analyzes the merits issues in Fisher; it does not address procedural challenges,
including standing and mootness, that UT raised in its response to the plaintiffs’ petition
for certiorari. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. (2012) (No. 11-345). For a discussion of these issues, see Amar, supra note 7, at 12–
18; Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge, 122 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming Sept. 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122956 (arguing that
there are significant procedural defects in Fisher).
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Part I provides the background on Grutter’s holding that enrollment of a critical mass of minority students is a compelling state interest. This Part illustrates that the chief educational benefits of diversity espoused in Grutter are the breakdown of racial stereotypes
and the facilitation of cross-racial understanding—by showing White
students that minority students from each group have a “variety of
10
viewpoints.” Consequently, a “critical mass” of minority students refers not only to numerical representation of racial groups, but also to
the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within each group, which
contribute to the educational benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter. This view of “critical mass” is different from other notions of the
concept that focus narrowly on numbers or define it by feelings of
isolation encountered by minority students. Thus, this Part shows
how “critical mass” is distinct from numerical goals and quotas, which
was one of Justice Kennedy’s key concerns in his Grutter dissent. Ultimately, this Part argues that “critical mass” is not a measurable entity—it is a concept which articulates a university’s compelling interest
in diversity, but it is not part of the narrow tailoring test for raceconscious admissions policies.
Part II expands upon this discussion by showing how within-group
diversity and critical mass are related to Grutter’s narrow tailoring
principles—thus illustrating the internal logic and coherence of a
11
much-maligned Grutter majority opinion.
It argues that Grutter’s
12
narrow tailoring principles aim to minimize the stigmatic harm of

10

11

12

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319–20 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn
there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”).
See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Grutter and Fisher: A Reassessment and a Preview, 65 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 57, 64 (2012) (discussing “problems with and perverse implications of the
student body diversity rationale Grutter adopts for justifying the use of racial preferences
in the context of higher education students admissions”); Roger Clegg, Attacking “Diversity”: A Review of Peter Wood’s Diversity: The Invention of a Concept, 31 J.C. & U.L. 417, 431
(2005) (claiming that “the Grutter Court relied on this rather convoluted reasoning” in its
articulation of diversity as a compelling interest); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213,
247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., specially concurring) (“Grutter represents a digression in
the course of constitutional law . . . .”). Even proponents of affirmative action have been
critical of Grutter’s emphasis on diversity instead of racial justice. See, e.g., Derrick Bell,
Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003) (“[T]he concept of diversity,
far from a viable means of ensuring affirmative action in the admissions policies of colleges and graduate schools, is a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial
justice.”).
Stigmatic harm is the constitutional harm that occurs when a government policy treats
individuals in the same manner solely because of their race. For a more detailed discussion of stigmatic harm, see infra Part II.A.
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race-conscious policies by ensuring that members of the same racial
group are given individualized consideration and not treated in exactly the same manner—the “least stigmatic means” theory of narrow
13
tailoring. This Part also argues that, in addition to its educational
benefits, within-group diversity helps to minimize stigmatic harm.
Accordingly, within-group diversity links critical mass and narrow tailoring and highlights the internal logic and coherence of the Grutter
majority opinion. Furthermore, a race-conscious policy can aim not
only to increase representation of different racial groups, but also to
generate diversity within racial groups. Finally, the analysis in this
Part illustrates how within-group diversity and narrow tailoring are related to courts’ deference to universities’ decisions in determining
their admissions policies.
Part III focuses the application of critical mass and deference in
Fisher. It first gives the background to Fisher, including the Fifth Cir14
cuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas, the enactment of the “race15
neutral” Top Ten Percent Law, and the reinstatement of raceconscious admissions after Grutter. Next, this Part considers the parties’ arguments regarding critical mass and deference, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on these issues, and Chief Judge Edith Jones’s critique of
this ruling in her dissent to the denial of an en banc hearing in Fish13

14
15

This Article argues that reducing the stigmatic harm of race-conscious admissions policies
is a key facet of Grutter, particularly for the narrow tailoring requirements and the critical
mass concept. See infra Part II.B. It does not, however, take a normative stance on whether reducing such stigmatic harm should be a major concern.
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
This Article presumes, as the Fisher litigation did, that the Top Ten Percent Law is “raceneutral”—meaning that there is no direct and explicit consideration of race in the decision-making process. Fisher, 644 F.3d at 306 (“Under that race-neutral law . . . the top ten
percent of graduates from every Texas high school were automatically admitted, and
many African-American and Hispanic students matriculated to the University.”). But see
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Calling . . .
10% or 20% plans ‘race-neutral’ seems to me disingenuous, for they ‘unquestionably
were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation of African-Americans
and Hispanics in the public higher education system.’” (quoting Brief for Respondents at
44, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516))). See also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 242
n.156 (5th Cir. 2011) (“A court considering the constitutionality of the [Top Ten Percent
Law] would examine whether Texas enacted the Law (and corresponding admissions policies) because of its effects on identifiable racial groups or in spite of those effects.”);
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259, 279 (1979) (finding a state statute giving preference to veterans for civil service positions constitutional because the state legislature did not enact the law “because of” but merely “in spite of” the law’s adverse effects
on women); Brief of Social Scientists Glenn C. Loury et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 9–10, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (noting that it is unclear
whether percentage plans are in fact race-neutral and that some amici counsel in Grutter
have signaled interest in challenging these percentage plans in subsequent litigation).
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16

er. It then critiques the application of critical mass in Fisher, concluding that “critical mass” and numerical goals were indistinguishable in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the case. Moreover, this Part also
illustrates how the Fisher panel’s deference to UT did not leave sufficient room for judicial review. In the process, this Part underscores
how critical mass and deference will be key points for Justice Kennedy
when deciding Fisher.
Part IV addresses standard of review and deference in detail. It
lays out three categories of review with respect to deference to universities: 1. Review of the actual implementation of race-conscious
policies as implemented, which requires strict scrutiny; 2. Review of
whether the university’s educational objective encompasses racial diversity (essentially, whether the university has a compelling interest in
diversity), which requires only “good faith” on the part of the university; and 3. Review of whether race-conscious admissions policies are
needed to attain this educational objective, which is the core issue in
Fisher and the source of controversy. Focusing on the third category,
this Part distinguishes between ex ante deference (before a university
applies a race-neutral policy to increase diversity) and ex post deference (after a university applies a race-neutral policy to increase diversity, as is the case in Fisher after the Top Ten Percent Law was implemented).
This Part then contends that after a race-neutral
admissions policy has been implemented, it is easier for courts to review the effectiveness of that policy and thus to apply a higher standard of review such as strict scrutiny.
Part V proposes an alternative method to decide Fisher, the
“unique contribution to diversity” test, which applies strict scrutiny.
The test proposed here does not treat critical mass in terms of numbers; in fact, it focuses on the race-conscious admissions policy itself
rather than on critical mass. The “unique contribution to diversity”
test assesses whether a race-conscious policy contributes to diversity in
a manner above and beyond any race-neutral measures that are in
place, such as the Top Ten Percent Law in Fisher. The argument here
is that UT should have to demonstrate explicitly that its raceconscious policy is used to increase the variety of viewpoints and experiences among minority students—by admitting minority students
in different majors, or from different cultural or socioeconomic
backgrounds who are not admitted in sufficient numbers via the Top
Ten Percent Law. Such a goals-means fit is characteristic of strict
16

Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting from the denial
of en banc rehearing).
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scrutiny. This Part then highlights the advantages of the “unique
contribution to diversity” test and shows how the test addresses Justice
Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter. Moreover, the test proposed here also
resolves a values conflict that Justice Kennedy faces in Fisher: the prospect that a race-neutral admissions policy (the Top Ten Percent
Law), which generates diversity only because of rampant racial segregation in public schools, could preclude UT from using raceconscious admissions measures. This conflict is key for Justice Kennedy, who stated that “avoiding racial isolation” is a compelling state
interest in his concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
17
Seattle School District Number 1.
I. CRITICAL MASS AS A COMPELLING INTEREST: THE ROLE OF
DIVERSITY WITHIN RACIAL GROUPS
In 2003, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authored the 5-4 majority
opinion in Grutter, in which the Court upheld the University of Mich18
igan Law School’s holistic admissions policy. Grutter adopted Justice
Lewis Powell’s concurrence in Regents of the University of California v.
19
Bakke, which had introduced the idea of diversity in education as a
20
compelling interest. The Court held that a holistic admissions poli17

18

19
20

551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation . . . .”). In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy also critiqued Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion for its “alltoo-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it
may be taken into account.” Id. at 787. Justice Kennedy further asserted that “[t]o the
extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my
view, profoundly mistaken.” Id. at 788. For an excellent scholarly analysis and critique of
Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in Parents Involved, see Christopher W. Schmidt,
Essay, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 206 (2008) (“Once
one seriously looks to the history of colorblind constitutionalism in the struggle that led
to Brown . . . the shortcomings of the Chief Justice’s account [in Parents Involved] become
readily apparent.”).
This Article defines a holistic admissions policy as one where various factors, from academic achievement to extracurricular activities to race, are subjectively considered together and weighed by admissions reviewers to make admissions decisions. This can be
contrasted with an admissions system which gives fixed weights to those various factors
and applies objective, mechanical formulas to determine who should be admitted.
See supra note 5.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (“The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a
diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution
of higher education.”). In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy also made it clear that he
did not object to the use of race in admissions to obtain the educational benefits of diversity. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387–88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The opinion by Justice
Powell [in Bakke], in my view, states the correct rule for resolving this case. . . . Justice
Powell’s approval of the use of race in university admissions reflected a tradition, ground-
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cy could use race as one, flexible factor, for the purpose of admitting
21
a critical mass of minority students. But what exactly is a “critical
22
mass”?
This is a key question in understanding the constitutionality of
race-conscious admissions—one that was raised several times during
23
the Supreme Court oral argument in Fisher v. Texas. The answer has
remained elusive, and this Part reviews and critiques some different
interpretations of the critical mass concept. Then, drawing upon Jus-

21

22

23

ed in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university’s conception of its educational
mission. . . . Our precedents provide a basis for the Court’s acceptance of a university’s
considered judgment that racial diversity among students can further its educational
task . . . .”); see also id. at 392–93 (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity. . . .”).
Id. at 333 (majority opinion) (“The Law School has determined, based on its experience
and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further
its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”).
See Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 97
(2007) (discussing uses of the “critical mass” concept in law). Professor Addis notes that
“[i]n the scientific world, the [term “critical mass”] is used to refer to the precise minimum level of fissionable plutonium or uranium that is required to start and sustain a
chain reaction of nuclear fission which will in turn lead to explosion.” Id. at 98. Professor Addis goes on to observe that:
While there is a degree of certainty as to what the phrase refers in the scientific
realm, there does not seem to be such clarity in relation to the application of the
phrase in the social and political world. . . . It may even be that its popularity is . . .
partly a function of its vagueness and elasticity that allow people to invoke it in various activities of social and political life. Sometimes the phrase is used to refer to
specific and empirically verifiable minimum numbers of people or levels of resources required for a social activity to succeed . . . . Other times, however, the
phrase seems to be used not as an analogy but as a metaphor, simply to indicate
that people’s actions or behavior depend on what others do or on what they expect others to do without an attempt to specify whether there is a minimum number or level of resource to trigger those actions or behavior.
Id. at 99. Professor Addis’s observations here show the flaws in directly analogizing between the scientific and social realms. Diversity in education is a complex phenomenon
which cannot be reliably sustained by reaching a particular minimum threshold. This Article contends that the meaning of “critical mass” is context-specific, and that in Grutter,
“critical mass” was intended merely as a metaphor to capture the notion of diversity within racial groups. See infra Part I.C.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14 (Justice Sotomayor asking Plaintiffs’
counsel “could you tell me what a critical mass was?”); id. at 20 (Justice Alito asking Plaintiffs’ counsel “do you understand what the University of Texas thinks is the definition of a
critical mass? Because I don’t.”); id. at 39 (Justice Alito asking UT’s counsel “[d]oes critical mass vary from group to group? Does it vary from State to State?”); id. at 45–46 (Chief
Justice Roberts asking UT’s counsel “you won’t tell me what the critical mass is . . . when
will we know that you’ve reached a critical mass?”); id. at 70–71 (Justice Scalia stating
“[w]e should probably stop calling it critical mass . . . [c]all it a cloud or something like
that.”). Even at the trial stage of Fisher v. University of Texas, Judge Sam Sparks of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas noted that “this esoteric critical mass of
diversity of students” was a concept that “kept eluding him.” Adam Liptak, College Diversity
Nears its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR4.
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tice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter, it argues that a critical
mass refers to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within racial groups. Such within-group diversity is related to the specific
compelling interest in diversity articulated in Grutter: the breakdown
24
of racial stereotypes and promotion of cross-racial understanding.
A. Rejecting Critical Mass as a Racial Quota or Numerical Goal
Critics of the Grutter ruling have viewed the concept of critical
mass solely in numerical terms. For example, Professor Lino Graglia
argues that “[i]t is difficult to see, in any event, how a ‘critical mass,’
some minimum number of a racial group, avoids being a quota by
25
not being more specifically defined.” In his Grutter dissent, Justice
Kennedy also stated that “critical mass is a delusion used by the Law
School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most
instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quo26
tas.” Independent of the University of Michigan Law School’s practices, however, it is important to delineate the theoretical distinction
between critical mass and numerical goals.
27
The Grutter majority affirmed Bakke’s rejection of racial quotas;
thus, it could not have adopted a definition of “critical mass” based
solely, or even primarily, on numbers or percentages of minority students. Justice O’Connor’s opinion noted that “[t]he Law School’s interest is not simply ‘to assure within its student body some specified
24

25

26

27

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[T]he Law School’s admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races.’” (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at
246a, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))). But see id. at 389, (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he concept of critical mass is . . . used . . . to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”). Justice Kennedy’s concern here underscores the need to clarify how
critical mass is different from numerical goals.
Lino A. Graglia, Grutter and Gratz: Race Preference to Increase Racial Representation Held “Patently Unconstitutional” Unless Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity”, 78 TUL.
L. REV. 2037, 2048 (2004). See also Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view of critical mass, infra
note 56 and accompanying text.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy’s concern reflected the
University of Michigan’s use of critical mass in practice, not an underlying concern with
the theory of critical mass as entailing within-group diversity. See id. at 389–90 (discussing
how the University of Michigan School of Law’s admissions numbers from 1987–1998
suggested that the school used numerical goals or racial quotas). Parts IV and V infra,
discuss how courts can review race-conscious admissions policies more stringently.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (majority opinion) (“As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly
individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way.
It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks.” (internal citation omitted)).
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percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic
origin’ . . . [t]hat would amount to outright racial balancing, which is
28
patently unconstitutional.” The Grutter majority did distinguish be29
tween a strict quota and a “permissible goal”; however, Justice Ken30
nedy’s dissent did not accept this subtle distinction, and it would
31
likely not survive further review in Fisher. Considering these circumstances, one can posit that Grutter allows “some attention to num32
bers,” but there must be more to the definition of “critical mass” to
distinguish it from numerical goals.
B. Critical Mass as a Counter to Tokenism: An Important But Limited View
During the trial phase of Grutter, the University of Michigan Law
School contended that there is “no number, percentage, or range of
33
numbers or percentages that constitute critical mass,” but it noted
that critical mass entailed “numbers such that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their
34
race.” Professor I. Bennett Capers contends that:

28
29

30

31

32

33
34

Id. at 329–30 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.)).
Id. at 335 (“In contrast [to a quota], ‘a permissible goal . . . require[s] only a good-faith
effort . . . to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself’. . . .” (quoting Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the obvious tension between the
pursuit of critical mass and the requirement of individual review in the University of
Michigan Law School’s admissions policy and citing the Law School’s consultation of daily reports which indicated the composition of the incoming class along racial lines).
It is possible that the Court could rule solely on the issue of deference to universities and
not address the meaning of “critical mass.” Nevertheless, if the Court does consider the
critical mass issue, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent underscores his problems with the
concept. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (majority opinion) (“The Law School’s goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a
quota. As the Harvard plan described by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course
‘some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for
those students admitted.’ ‘[S]ome attention to numbers,’ without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.” (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323)).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 319. The Plaintiffs in Fisher also defined “critical mass” in similar terms. See Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 243 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that “the concept of critical mass is defined by the minimum threshold for minority
students to have their ideas represented in class discussions and not to feel isolated or like
spokespersons for their race”); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213
(No. 09-50822) (arguing that “critical mass” is defined as “a sufficient number of underrepresented minority students such that such minority students would ‘not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race’”).
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[C]ritical mass is not solely numerical. Rather, a critical mass implies a
climate where one is neither conspicuous nor on display, where one does
not feel the opprobrium of being a token, nor the burden of being the
designated representative for an entire group. It also implies a climate
where one can speak freely, where one not only has a voice, but a voice
35
that will be heard.

It is very important for universities to acknowledge and address
feelings of isolation and tokenism among minority students. But for
several reasons, this is not sufficient to define “critical mass” under
Grutter. First, “numbers such that underrepresented minority stu36
dents do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race” still
implies that critical mass can be defined by numbers, even if these
numbers may vary or constitute a range rather than a set numerical
goal. This runs very close to Justice Kennedy’s concern that “critical
mass is a delusion used by the Law School . . . to achieve numerical
37
goals indistinguishable from quotas.” Justice Sotomayor also raised
38
this concern during the Fisher oral argument at the Supreme Court.
35

36
37

38

I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122–23 (2004). Professor Capers presents a
more nuanced view, focusing on the climate for minority students rather than on numbers. At the Fisher oral argument, UT’s counsel adopted a similar definition, stating that
“critical mass is an environment in which students of underrepresented . . . [minority
groups] . . . [do not] . . . feel like spokespersons for their race.” See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 1, at 46–47. This Article agrees with Professor Capers’s point, but it
contends that Grutter defined “critical mass” primarily in terms of the educational benefits
of diversity. It is these educational benefits that are the compelling interest in Grutter. See
infra Part II.C.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319.
Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Grutter did attempt to distinguish critical mass from
racial quotas. Id. at 335 (“In contrast [to a quota], ‘a permissible goal . . . require[s] only
a good-faith effort . . . to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself’. . . . ” (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring))). However, Justice Kennedy did not accept this distinction. Moreover, in the Grutter oral argument, Justice Scalia asked counsel for the University of Michigan whether
two, four, or eight percent constitutes a critical mass and followed up by stating, “You
have to pick some number, don’t you?” Transcript of Arguments in Grutter v. Bollinger,
N.Y. TIMES,
Apr.
1,
2003,
at
9,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/
politics/02TEXT1.html. Counsel for the University of Michigan responded, “No, Your
Honor, if it was a fixed range that said that it will be a minimum of 8 percent, come hell
or high water, no matter what the qualifications of these applicants look like, no matter
what it is that the majority applicants could contribute to the benefits of diversity, then
certainly that would be a quota, but that is not what occurred here. And in fact the testimony was undisputed, that this was not intended to be a fixed goal.” Id. Nevertheless,
this Article argues that numbers alone are not sufficient to understand or apply the critical mass concept. From the perspective of this Article, asking what percentage constitutes
a critical mass is insufficient because it does not take into account the within-group diversity which is necessary to break down racial stereotypes and obtain the educational benefits of diversity.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 19 (Justice Sotomayor asking Plaintiffs’
counsel if “you have to set a quota for critical mass?”). Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that
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Second, studies suggest that minority students still do feel isolated
39
and alienated on college campuses, so if this is the primary justification for race-conscious admissions policies, then those policies may
not be working. This could raise questions about whether universities
40
are actually fulfilling their compelling interest in diversity.
Finally, while alleviating feelings of isolation and tokenism is important to attaining the educational benefits of diversity, the Grutter
majority opinion focused more directly on those educational bene41
fits. In order to attain the educational benefits of diversity, universities must aim to create campus environments where minority students feel comfortable speaking and interacting with non-minority
students. But from the Grutter majority’s perspective, this is the
means rather than the end, and it is not the defining feature of “criti42
cal mass.”

39

40

41

42

there is “a huge difference” between a quota and “having a range, a view as to what would
be an appropriate level of comfort, critical mass . . .” Id. But Justice Sotomayor retorted,
“[s]o we won’t call it a quota; we’ll call it a goal . . . it sounds awfully like a quota to me
that Grutter said you should not be doing. . . .” Id.
See, e.g., Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1233 (2010) (acknowledging “the power of
creating critical mass and a diverse classroom” but noting that “stigma and racism . . .
were still present”); Tara J. Yosso et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and
Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 659, 660 (2009)
(examining the ways in which Latinas/os respond to racial microaggressions and confront hostile campus racial climates).
But see infra note 59 and accompanying text (noting that the University of Michigan Law
School did not actually contend that it had enrolled a critical mass of minority students,
but only that its admissions policy aimed toward that goal). It is possible that the Law
School never attained an actual critical mass, where minority students no longer felt isolated. This could well be a good argument to expand race-conscious policies to admit
more minority students, but Justice Kennedy and the Supreme Court are very unlikely to
do so in Fisher.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (“[T]he Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference
to the substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed
to produce . . . .”). See also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that “critical mass” should be defined through “reference to the educational benefits
that diversity is designed to produce”). This Article contends that while the Fisher opinion claimed that “critical mass” should be defined in terms of the educational benefits of
diversity, its application of the concept did not reflect this, and its articulation of these
educational benefits was incomplete. See infra Parts III.B. and III.D. But even the Fisher
plaintiffs agree that “Grutter endorses an inward-facing concept of diversity that focuses on
the functioning of the student body and the educational benefits that arise from admitting
a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students . . . .” Brief for the PlaintiffsAppellants at 33, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822).
See infra Part I.C.
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C. The Grutter Majority’s Functional View of Critical Mass: Educational
Benefits of Within-Group Diversity
The Grutter majority further defined “critical mass” in functional
terms:
[T]he Law School’s concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce . . . . These
benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law
School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps
to break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better un43
derstand persons of different races.”

Under this view, critical mass refers to a sufficiently diverse group
of perspectives within each racial group to actualize the educational
44
benefits of diversity. According to the Grutter majority, the goal of a
race-conscious admissions policy should be to produce a critical mass
45
with a “variety of viewpoints among minority students.” Such withingroup variation actualizes the educational benefits of diversity, as it
serves to break down racial stereotypes: “[W]hen a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose
their force because nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority
viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority stu46
dents.”

43
44

45
46

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
See e.g., id. (“[Educational] benefits [of diversity] are substantial. [T]he Law School’s
admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.’ . . .
These benefits are ‘important and laudable,’ because ‘classroom discussion is livelier,
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’ when the students have
‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’” (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 246a, 244a, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))).
Id. at 320.
Id. at 319–20. See also id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need for critical
mass on ‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some
characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ . . . To the contrary, diminishing the force
of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.” (quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. at 30, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))). This language in
Grutter speaks to the immediate, proximal impact of having a “critical mass.” When evaluating critical mass in Fisher, the Fifth Circuit panel did not cite this language, instead defining the educational benefits of diversity in much broader terms: 1. “Increased Perspectives”—those brought by diverse groups of students into the classroom, which add
valuable knowledge and make for engaging classroom discussions; 2. “Professionalism”—
preparing students for “work and citizenship” by exposing them to diverse people and
viewpoints; and 3. “Civic Engagement”—creating paths to leadership for individuals of
every race and ethnicity. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 219–20 and infra notes 186 and 212–14
and accompanying text.
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Grutter’s language thus suggests that “meaningful representation”
is not just contingent upon numbers of minority students, but also
includes sufficiently diverse experiences and perspectives within ra48
cial groups. This allows racial stereotypes to be broken down and
facilitates the educational benefits of diversity, which are the constitutional justification for race-conscious admissions policies in the first
place. When understood not only in terms of diverse representation
of racial groups, but also different experiences and perspectives within racial groups, the concept of a critical mass of minority students is
49
directly related to the compelling interest articulated in Grutter.
1. Why Critical Mass Cannot Be Defined by Minority Student Numbers
This emphasis on within-group diversity also clarifies how critical
mass is different from numerical goals or quotas. By definition, diversity within racial groups cannot be attained merely by admitting
particular numbers or percentages of students from each minority
group, or even by monitoring the numbers of students admitted from
50
such groups. Within-group diversity may involve “[s]ome attention
47
48

49

50

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318.
Of course, there cannot be sufficient within-group diversity if there are not adequate
numbers of a particular minority group. However, no particular number or percentage
of a given racial group automatically guarantees that within-group diversity is present.
That is an assessment that institutions must make themselves.
In a different context (voting rights), Justice Kennedy himself underscored the importance of considering diversity within racial groups. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 434 (2006) (“We do a disservice to . . . important goals
by failing to account for the differences between people of the same race.”). But see Edward C. Thomas, Comment, Racial Classification and the Flawed Pursuit of Diversity: How
Phantom Minorities Threaten “Critical Mass” Justification in Higher Education, 2007 BYU L.
REV. 813, 815–16 (arguing that “phantom minorities,” who take advantage of raceconscious admissions policies even though they “look white, have Anglo names, and come
from backgrounds void of racial-life experience” undermine the critical mass justification
for affirmative action). Justice Thomas’s point underscores the need for admissions
committees to consider race in the context of an applicant’s entire profile, in conjunction
with other factors, and to use individualized review to consider how each applicant contributes to the educational benefits of diversity. Regardless of whether this type of nuanced review is the current norm in university admissions, this Article argues that it is the
standard that courts should enforce when evaluating universities’ race-conscious admissions policies. See infra Part IV.
This was another salient concern raised by Justice Kennedy. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the
admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at individual review save for
race itself. The admissions officers could use the reports to recalibrate the plus factor
given to race depending on how close they were to achieving the Law School’s goal of
critical mass. The bonus factor of race would then become divorced from individual review; it would be premised instead on the numerical objective set by the Law School.”).
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51

to numbers,” but universities must consider factors beyond race to
attain a variety of viewpoints and experiences within various racial
52
groups. This point is key to addressing Justice Kennedy’s concern
53
about critical mass, because unlike the two views of critical mass pos54
ited earlier, within-group diversity cannot conceivably be defined by
a number, percentage, or range of students from a minority group: it
cannot even be expressed in such terms, as some account of variation
55
within that group is necessary. Moreover, Part II infra will illustrate
how Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles make much more sense in
light of this view of “critical mass.”
2. Why Critical Mass Can Vary for Different Minority Groups
In his dissenting opinion in Grutter, the late Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, raised a
more general question about critical mass: why were different numbers of students admitted for different racial groups? Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted:
[F]rom 1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted between 1,130 and
1,310 students. Of those, between 13 and 19 were Native American, between 91 and 108 were African-American, and between 47 and 56 were
Hispanic. If the Law School is admitting between 91 and 108 AfricanAmericans in order to achieve “critical mass,” thereby preventing AfricanAmerican students from feeling “isolated or like spokespersons for their
race,” one would think that a number of the same order of magnitude
would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics and
Native Americans. Similarly, even if all of the Native American applicants
admitted in a given year matriculate, which the record demonstrates is
not at all the case, how can this possibly constitute a “critical mass” of Native Americans in a class of over 350 students? In order for this pattern of
admission to be consistent with the Law School’s explanation of “critical
mass,” one would have to believe that the objectives of “critical mass” offered by respondents are achieved with only half the number of Hispanics and one-sixth the number of Native Americans as compared to Afri51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 336.
See infra Part II.C.
See supra notes 26 and 37 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.A and I.B.
A quota or numerical goal is obviously expressed as a number or percentage, and there
are numbers and percentages (e.g., 50% or 75%) which would have to be sufficient for
group members not to feel isolated—leading to the inquiry posed by Justice Scalia in the
Grutter oral argument: “You have to pick some number, don’t you?” Transcript of Arguments in Grutter v. Bollinger, supra note 37. Within-group diversity, on the other hand,
can never be determined by numbers or percentages. To take an extreme example, even
if 95% of the students in a class are members of a given group, the class might benefit
from a member of that group who has very different viewpoints and experiences.
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can-Americans. But respondents offer no race-specific reasons for such
disparities. Instead, they simply emphasize the importance of achieving
“critical mass,” without any explanation of why that concept is applied
56
differently among the three underrepresented minority groups.

Professor Clark Cunningham echoes Chief Justice Rehnquist in
lamenting the lack of response from other Justices to these critiques
57
of the Law School’s admissions numbers.
Both Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Professor Cunningham assume a numerical definition
58
of critical mass, which the Grutter majority repudiated. Nevertheless,
there are several possible responses to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s question.
First, in Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School did not actually contend that it had reached a critical mass of any minority
group, but rather only that its race-conscious admissions policy
59
“seeks” to attain this “goal.” It is possible that the number of Native
56
57

58

59

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Clark D. Cunningham, After Grutter Things Get Interesting! The American Debate Over Affirmative Action Is Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas From Abroad, 36 CONN. L. REV. 665, 670
(2004) (“Although one wonders whether the Chief Justice actually would have voted to
uphold the law school’s affirmative action program as long as it had admitted larger
numbers of Hispanic and Native American applicants, the evidence he cited would seem
to call for a response. However, the majority opinion authored by Justice O’Connor did
not really respond to either Justice Kennedy or Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concerns.”).
Justice O’Connor did actually respond directly to Chief Justice Rehnquist in her Grutter
opinion. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (“The Chief Justice believes that the Law School’s policy
conceals an attempt to achieve racial balancing, and cites admissions data to contend that
the Law School discriminates among different groups within the critical mass. . . . But, as
The Chief Justice concedes, the number of underrepresented minority students who ultimately enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their representation in the
applicant pool and varies considerably for each group from year to year.”). Justice
O’Connor’s response suggests that critical mass can vary because it is not just about numbers of minority students, but about the diverse viewpoints and experiences within each
minority group—a mix that varies substantially from year to year.
See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. See also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d
213, 219 (5th Cir. 2011) (“In his [Grutter] dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist saw critical
mass as only the minimum level necessary ‘[t]o ensure that the[] minority students do
not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race; to provide adequate opportunities
for the type of interaction upon which the educational benefits of diversity depend; and
to challenge all students to think critically and reexamine stereotypes.’ On this view, critical mass is defined only as a proportion of the student body, and the percentage that suffices for one minority group should also suffice for another group. In contrast, Justice
O’Connor, writing for the Court [in Grutter], explained that critical mass must be ‘defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.’”
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330, 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting))).
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“As part of its goal of ‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse,’ the Law School seeks to ‘enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.’” (quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger at 13, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)) (emphasis added)). The University of Michigan Law School’s
brief in Grutter also suggests that enrollment of a critical mass is a “hope” rather than an
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Americans admitted was limited by the number of Native American
applicants. Moreover, even if there were more Native American applicants who could have been admitted, the University was limited by
the finite consideration it could give to race in the admissions process, lest race become too large of a factor and render the policy un60
constitutional. Justice Kennedy in particular emphasized that race
61
should not be the “predominant factor” in admissions. Thus, the
Law School could not have categorically admitted every Native American student without violating Grutter’s own narrow tailoring principles for race-conscious admissions policies. Attaining a critical mass
of a minority group was one of the University’s goals, but that goal
62
had to be balanced with other priorities.
In that vein, not only is there a limited applicant pool, but there
are also a limited number of spots in any admitted class. An institution must make decisions about which perspectives are most important to achieving its desired educational benefits, and this can
lead to different numbers of students admitted from various racial
groups. As part of its educational autonomy, an institution must also
determine which of many diverse perspectives is most important in
breaking down racial stereotypes and promoting the other educa63
tional benefits of diversity. For example, a university in Arizona or

60

61

62

63

outcome it attains each year. See Brief for Respondents at 13, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No.
02-241), 2003 WL 402236 (“[T]he Law School hopes that its policy will enroll a ‘critical
mass’ of minority students.” (emphasis added)).
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system—it cannot ‘insulat[e] each category of applicants with
certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants.’ Instead, a university may consider race or ethnicity only as a ‘“plus” in a particular applicant’s file,’
without ‘insulat[ing] the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats.’” (quoting United States v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315, 317 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J., concurring.))).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve
diversity, but an educational institution must ensure, through sufficient procedures,
that . . . race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.”).
It should be noted that the plaintiff’s expert witness in Grutter conceded that “race is not
the predominant factor in the Law School’s admissions calculus.” Id. at 320.
See Brief for Respondents at 42–43, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“The Law School’s
desire for a ‘critical mass’ of students from otherwise underrepresented minority groups
is only one of many educational goals pursued through the admissions policy, and it is at
all times weighed against other educational objectives. Dean Lehman and the other trial
witnesses testified unequivocally that the Law School would and does regularly reject
qualified minority candidates, even if that risks falling short of a critical mass . . . .”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy: ‘The freedom of a
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New Mexico may determine that more perspectives from Mexican
Americans are necessary, given the large Mexican American populations in those states. Similarly, an institution in South Dakota may
choose to emphasize perspectives from Native Americans to a greater
extent. Local history and social and political dynamics determine
both the prevalence of racial stereotypes in a given area, and the particular mix of perspectives necessary to help break down those stereotypes and facilitate cross-racial understanding. Even at elite universities with national student bodies, there is significant variation in local
64
and institutional history and social dynamics.
Thus, universities are in the best position to determine the mix of
65
students that constitutes a critical mass of diverse perspectives. Even
if critical mass could be conceptualized solely in terms of numbers of
66
minority students, a university cannot possibly admit a critical mass
of every group. There are too many different racial/ethnic groups
with varying experiences and perspectives, all of which could contribute to the educational benefits of diversity. Moreover, enrollment
of minority students may be limited by other factors, such as the
67
availability of financial aid. Given limited resources and the limited
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66
67

university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body.’ . . . From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select
those students who will contribute the most to the “robust exchange of ideas,”’ a university ‘seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.’” (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312–13)).
For example, some Ivy League universities, such as Yale, Columbia, and the University of
Pennsylvania, are located in urban communities that are predominantly African American, whereas others, such as Cornell and Dartmouth, are located in rural, predominantly
White communities. Moreover, institutional history can also play a significant role: for
example, the charter for Dartmouth aimed to create an institution “for the education and
instruction of Youth of the Indian Tribes in this Land . . . and also of English Youth and
any others.”
See About the Native American Program, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE,
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nap/about/ (last updated Mar. 26, 2012). Since 1970,
when then President John G. Kemeny of Dartmouth renewed the institution’s commitment to Native Americans, “nearly 700 Native Americans from over 200 different tribes
have attended Dartmouth, more than at all the other Ivy League institutions combined.”
Id.
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 238 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is no reason to
assume that critical mass will or should be the same for every racial group or every university.”). Alternatively, a university might also decide that racial stereotypes of a specific
group—for example, African Americans—are particularly pervasive and pernicious on a
broader level, and that the breakdown of those stereotypes is central to its educational
mission. Racial stereotypes are perpetuated by both local circumstances and the national
media, and there is no prescription for how to best break them down.
See supra notes 27–29 (discussing why critical mass cannot be defined numerically).
See Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability of Minority-Targeted Aid in
Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851, 853 (2010) (noting that “actually enrolling a critical
mass of minority students [is] a goal that is often unattainable without financial aid”).
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size of its admitted class, a university must make its own judgments
about which perspectives should be included and are most central to
68
its educational mission —so long as any race-conscious admissions
policies it employs adhere to Grutter’s guidelines. In fact, this is the
reason for Grutter’s deference to colleges and universities in the ad69
missions process.
Finally, in terms of minority students feeling “isolated or like
70
spokespersons for their race,” Justice Rehnquist failed to consider
that members of one minority group may help members of other minority groups feel less isolated. For example, if there are African
American and Latino students in a class who speak up and share their
views, then a Native American student may feel more emboldened to
do so. In fact, minority student organizations regularly collaborate
on activities and interact and support one another at many institu71
tions of higher education.

68
69

70
71

See supra notes 64–65 (discussing various considerations a university might take into account when deciding what critical mass of minority students it should seek to admit).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003) (“Our holding today is in keeping
with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits. . . . ‘[G]ood faith’ on the part of a university is
‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”).
Id. at 319.
For example, since 1978, undergraduate student of color organizations at the University
of Pennsylvania have formed an umbrella group called the United Minorities Council,
which sponsors events that promote unity among various minority groups. See THE
UNITED MINORITIES COUNCIL, http://unitedminoritiescouncil.org/ (last visited Oct. 2,
2012). Similarly, the University of Pennsylvania School of Law has a student group called
the United Law Students of Color Council (“ULSCC”). See https://www.law.upenn.edu/
cf/StudentOrganizations/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2012). White students are also
sometimes involved in these types of coalitions; for example, at the University of Pennsylvania, there is also a Black-Jewish student coalition called Alliance and Understanding.
See THE GREENFIELD INTERCULTURAL CENTER, Alliance and Understanding,
http://www.vpul.upenn.edu/gic/au.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). Additionally, at the
New York University School of Law, the various student of color organizations—the Black
Allied Law Students Association (“BALSA”), Latino Law Students Association (“LLSA”),
Asian Pacific American Law Students Association (“APALSA”), South Asian Law Students
Association (“SALSA”), and the Multiracial Law Students Association (“MuLSA”)—held
an “All-ALSA” Symposium in 2008 entitled “Can People of Color Become a United Coalition?” See Vinay Harpalani, Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Awakening: A South Asian Becoming
“Critically” Aware of Race in America, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 82 (2009).
These organizations have also formed an “All-ALSA” Coalition and regularly meet and
collaborate on events. See, e.g., All ALSA Coalition Graduation and Reception,
http://its.law.nyu.edu/eventcalendar/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.detail&id=18723 (last
visited Oct. 2, 2012). Also, the Black, Latino, Asian Pacific Law Alumni Association
(“BLAPA”) serves the same purpose for alumni of NYU School of Law. See BLACK,
LATINO, ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LAW ASSOCIATION, http://www.law.nyu.edu/
alumni/alumniassociations/blapa/index.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
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3. Can Critical Mass Be Measured at All?
It is important to note that while Grutter allows “‘[s]ome attention
72
to numbers,’” this Article argues that critical mass is not readily
measurable in practice. As noted, attaining a critical mass requires an
73
admissions committee to look to other factors beyond race, so mere
numbers or percentages of minority students would not allow one to
determine if a critical mass is present. Based on the interaction of
various demographic characteristics and life experiences (including
those involving race), Grutter envisioned that a given student may express one or more perspectives or characteristics that add to the mix
74
of ideas in an admitted class. The student’s unique contribution in
this milieu depends in part on the other perspectives represented in
the applicant pool; thus, it is not possible to accurately predict ex
ante how many students of a given group are necessary to meet the
goals of attaining the educational benefits of diversity. Moreover,
these benefits may vary based on local history, demographics, and
politics, or the institution’s history and educational mission, all of
which can also change over time. Thus, critical mass may vary by institution and may vary over time with local and national demographic
changes. As noted, it may also be different for different racial
75
groups.
Because of these complexities, it would be difficult to devise a
consistent judicial standard to determine whether an institution has
76
attained a “critical mass.” In theory, one might devise an index of
72
73

74

75

76

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336.
Id. at 337 (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute
to a diverse educational environment.”).
Id. at 309 (“The Law School’s admissions program . . . is flexible enough to ensure that
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity
the defining feature of the application. . . . The Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. There is no policy,
either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft”
variable. . . . [T]he program adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race.”).
See supra Part I.C.2; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 238 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he educational benefits recognized in Grutter go beyond the narrow ‘pedagogical concept’
urged by Appellants. On this understanding, there is no reason to assume that critical
mass will or should be the same for every racial group or every university.”).
When Fisher was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the amicus brief of the Mountain States
Legal Foundation made a similar claim. See Brief for Mountain States Legal Foundation
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 14, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822)
(“[B]ecause critical mass cannot be quantified, no court is able to determine whether a
critical mass of minority students is present or lacking.”).
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various types of diversity—socioeconomic, geographic, experiential,
political, etc.—and aim to measure diversity within racial groups, in
addition to the numbers of students from each racial group. In practice, however, this would be a difficult and subjective enterprise for a
court to undertake; it is best left to university admissions committees
77
who can assess these factors and local conditions more effectively.
This is why Grutter entrusts colleges and university admissions committees to employ “good faith” when using race as a factor in the ad78
missions process.
Because critical mass cannot be readily measured, this Article argues that it is merely part of the definition of Grutter’s compelling interest, not part of the narrow tailoring test for race-conscious admis79
sions policies. This does not mean, however, that there is no room
for more stringent judicial review of race-conscious admissions policies in Fisher v. Texas, as Parts IV and V will show.
II. WITHIN-GROUP DIVERSITY, NARROW TAILORING, AND DEFERENCE:
REDUCING STIGMATIC HARM
Grutter stands in contrast with much of the Supreme Court’s recent race and affirmative action jurisprudence. In the two decades
preceding Grutter, the Court was much more apt to strike down race77

78

79

However, at the Fisher Supreme Court oral argument, counsel for the United States as
amicus curiae in support of UT did contend that courts could determine whether a critical mass is present at a university. When asked by Chief Justice Roberts how to tell when a
university has attained a critical mass, counsel for the United States answered:
I think the Court . . . has to make its own independent judgment . . . [by]
look[ing] at the kind of information that the university considered . . . [t]hat
could be information about the composition of the class . . . classroom diversity . . . . retention and graduation rates . . . the university’s context in history . . .
[a]nd then what the Court’s got to do is satisfy itself that the University . . . needs
to consider race to further advance the educational goals that Grutter has identified as a compelling interest.
Transcript of Oral Argument supra note 1, at 69–70.
Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309–10. (“The Court takes the Law School at its word that it would
like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its
use of racial preferences as soon as practicable.”).
UT contended that the Fisher Plaintiffs framed critical mass as part of both the compelling
interest and narrow tailoring prongs of strict scrutiny:
Plaintiffs contend that UT’s revised admissions policy is not narrowly tailored because . . . it was not needed for UT to enroll a critical mass of underrepresented
minorities. (At times, Plaintiffs refer to this as a “compelling interest” argument,
and at other times they characterize it as a “narrow tailoring” argument. But the
argument is meritless regardless of nomenclature.)
Brief of Appellees at 43, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 0950822). The argument for resolving Fisher posed by this Article is not contingent upon
whether critical mass is considered part of the compelling interest or narrow tailoring
prong. See infra Parts IV and V.
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80

conscious policies. Since 2003, the Court has narrowed the scope of
81
Grutter to higher education. The Court’s deviation in Grutter has
largely been attributed to the unique educational benefits of student
82
diversity at colleges and universities.
However, another factor that distinguished Grutter from other affirmative action cases was the flexible, unquantified manner in which
the University of Michigan Law School used race in the context of its
holistic admissions policy. Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion laid
out several criteria for narrowly tailored, race-conscious, holistic admissions policies: individualized consideration of all applicants, flexible, non-mechanical use of race, no insulation from competition
based on race, no undue harm or burden to non-minority applicants,

80

81

82

Justice O’Connor herself had authored numerous opinions which invalidated raceconscious policies under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 657 (1993) (striking down North Carolina’s congressional redistricting plan because
“[r]acial classifications . . . pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. . . . [because]
[t]hey reinforce the belief . . . that individuals should be judged by the color of their
skin. . . . Racial gerrymandering . . . may balkanize us into competing racial factions”);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down the city of
Richmond’s minority set-aside program for contracts); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (striking down the “layoff provision”
which preserved jobs of minority teachers with less seniority). Even in the few cases
where the Court upheld race-conscious policies, Justice O’Connor had dissented. See
Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (upholding race-conscious policies implemented by Federal Communications
Commission); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(upholding “one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement”).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 765 (2007)
(striking down race-conscious public school assignment plans in Seattle and Louisville
and noting that in Grutter, the Court’s “deference [in the use of race] was prompted by
factors uniquely relevant to higher education”).
See Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
60, 60 (2004) (noting that “[i]n Grutter, the Court spelled out in some detail the potential
educational advantages of student diversity . . . thus . . . grounding in social science . . .
the advantages Justice Powell had asserted [in Bakke] on the basis of less evidence”).
Karst also highlighted the role of three amicus briefs—one from military leaders, another
from business leaders, and a third from organized labor—in facilitating the Court’s acceptance of diversity in education as a compelling state interest. Id. at 66–69. See also
Marcia G. Synnott, The Evolving Diversity Rationale in University Admissions: From Regents v.
Bakke to the University Of Michigan Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 493 (2005) (“Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion recognized that race may also be used in an inclusive way to
achieve diversity that is beneficial to white and minority students alike.”); Colin S. Diver,
From Equality to Diversity: The Detour from Brown to Grutter, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 699
(2004) (“In her opinion for the Grutter majority, Justice O’Connor variably characterizes
the state’s interests as: ‘obtaining “the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body”’; “‘attaining a diverse student body’; and ‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse.’”).
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and “sunset” provisions to eventually end race-conscious policies.
While many commentators have criticized its treatment of narrow tai84
loring as a deviation from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, this
Part explains Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles in terms of minimizing the stigmatic harm of race-conscious admissions policies—a
goal that is consistent with the Court’s recent race jurisprudence.
Additionally, this Part illustrates how Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles are related to the critical mass concept and particularly to diversity within racial groups—thus providing internal logic and coher85
ence to the much-maligned Grutter majority opinion.
A. Overview of Stigmatic Harm
To explain Grutter’s theory of narrow tailoring, it is first necessary
to define “stigmatic harm.” In the Supreme Court’s recent race jurisprudence, stigmatic harm can be understood as the harm that occurs when a government policy reinforces racial stereotypes. For example, Justice O’Connor, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
describes this harm:
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. . . . [T[hey
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility. . . . [R]einforc[ing] common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection
86
based on a factor having no relation to individual worth.

The harm espoused here is a constitutional harm, not a tangible
87
or psychological one. Some commentators have embraced the view
83
84

85
86
87

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 341–42 (2003) (describing the features of a narrowly tailored
race-conscious admissions policy).
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and
Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2007) (arguing that Grutter deviates from the traditional
“least restrictive means” test of narrow tailoring); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue
in the Affirmative Action Cases: Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 483, 538 (2004)
(arguing that in Gratz and Grutter, “the Court performed poorly in defining narrow tailoring. The majority spent most of its effort explaining what narrow tailoring is not, and little in defining what it is”).
See supra note 11.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989).
This notion of stigmatic harm is very similar to the definition of “expressive harm” articulated by Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi:
An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material
consequences the action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate
the Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the
very meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public
values.
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that race-conscious policies directly stigmatize and inflict psychologi88
cal harms upon minorities, and this is a debated issue. However, the
presence or absence of any such psychological harms or other tangible effects is not the relevant issue. The Court’s recent race jurisprudence describes constitutional stigmatic harm as that which occurs
when government action itself reinforces racial stereotypes; the tangible results of such action are not relevant to the constitutional analysis. As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissenting opinion in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, “Social scientists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and behavior reflect their
background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may
not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the as89
sumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think.”

88

89

Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
506–07 (1993). Professors Pildes and Niemi further note that the “harm is not concrete
to particular individuals,” but rather “lies in the disruption to constitutionally underwritten public understandings about the appropriate structure of values.” Id. at 507.
See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and
because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving. This problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the ‘beneficiaries’ of
racial discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of government,
industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part
in their advancement. The question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or
it did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would
succeed without discrimination.”); Clegg, supra note 11, at 435 (contending that raceconscious admissions policies “stigmatize the so-called beneficiaries in the eyes of their
classmates, teachers, and themselves . . .”); Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the
Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1755, 1812 (2006) (arguing that partners in law firms
have low expectations of black associates); Joshua M. Levine, Comment, Stigma’s Opening:
Grutter’s Diversity Interest(s) and the New Calculus for Affirmative Action in Higher Education,
94 CAL. L. REV. 457, 487 (2006) (referring to Justice Clarence Thomas as “a black person
who has felt stigmatic harm from others questioning his competency and pressuring him
to conform to racial stereotypes”). But see Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg:
Which Came First—Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1346 (2008) (arguing
that “affirmative action policies do not in fact ‘harm’ students of color in the way that opponents of affirmative action have claimed”).
497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Also, in Shaw v. Reno, Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion noted that “‘an explicit policy of assignment by race may
serve to stimulate our society’s latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual’s
worth or needs.’” 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg,
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)). Professors Pildes and Niemi argue that Shaw is rooted in the notion that “the state has impermissibly
endorsed too dominant a role for race,” and that the decision “might rest on the intrinsic
ground that the endorsement is wrong, in and of itself,” or “on the instrumental ground
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Thus, stigmatic harm as conceptualized in the Court’s jurisprudence occurs when a government policy treats individuals in the same
manner based on racial group membership, regardless of the nega90
tive or positive consequences for minorities (or for non-minorities).
B. Grutter’s Theory of Narrow Tailoring
Having defined stigmatic harm, this Part now illustrates how Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles aim to minimize the stigmatic harm
of its race-conscious policies.
1. The Gratz/Grutter Distinction
At the same time it upheld the Law School’s admissions policy in
Grutter, the Court struck down the University of Michigan’s raceconscious admissions policy for the College of Letters, Sciences, and
91
Arts (“LSA”) in Gratz v. Bollinger. The Gratz plan relied on a fixed
weight point system rather than a flexible, holistic admissions process; LSA’s admissions policy automatically awarded twenty points on
a 150-point scale to applicants from underrepresented minority
92
groups, a measure the Court found to be too rigid and mechani93
cal—failing to “provide . . . individualized consideration.”
Various scholars have critiqued the Court’s distinction between
94
Gratz and Grutter. Professor Cass Sunstein contends that:
[I]n the context of affirmative action, Justice O’Connor’s interest in caseby-case judgment has led her to a puzzling and probably indefensible

90

91
92
93
94

that this state endorsement threatens to reshape social perceptions along similar lines.”
Pildes and Niemi, supra note 87, at 509.
For an alternative view of racial stigmatic harms, see R. A. Lenhardt, Understanding the
Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2004) (arguing
“that stigmatic harm occurs when a given act or policy sends the message that racial difference renders a person or a group inferior to Whites, the category constructed as the
racial norm”). This Article does not question the validity of Professor Lenhardt’s proposition; it merely contends that the Supreme Court has a different view of stigmatic harm,
as apparent in its race jurisprudence, including Grutter. See supra Part II.A.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2009).
Id. at 255.
Id. at 271.
See, e.g., Ayres & Foster, supra note 84; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1899, 1902 (2006); Crump, supra note 84, at 528–29 (“One can argue that the undergraduate Michigan program at issue in Gratz, involving a fixed-point system, should
have been regarded as constitutionally superior to the unlimited discretion model in
Grutter . . . . At least in such a system the invidious exercise of discretion has been structured, confined, and checked . . . . The point system used in the undergraduate program
struck down in Gratz should instead have been preferred because it makes the racial remedy visible . . . .”).
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conclusion. It is hardly clear that the Constitution should be taken to require a procedure that sacrifices transparency, predictability, and equal
treatment—and that does so while imposing significant burdens on offi95
cials who must evaluate particular applications for admission.

Professor Sunstein attributes Justice O’Connor’s Grutter decision to
96
her general “holistic practice,” shown through judicial minimalism
97
and a “preference for case-by-case judgment.” Professor Heather
Gerkin espouses a different view, emphasizing stealth as value em98
braced in the Grutter approach to race-conscious admissions.
While these are valid perspectives, another explanation for the
Gratz-Grutter distinction can be found in the Court’s attempt to mini99
mize the stigmatic harm of race preferences. In Gratz, the majority
noted that the “LSA policy does not provide . . . individualized consideration . . . [because it] . . . auto-matically distributes 20 points to
every single applicant from an ‘underrepresented minority’ group, as
100
defined by the University.”
In contrast to the LSA policy struck
down in Gratz, the Law School admissions policy upheld in Grutter did
not use a point system; rather, it considered race subjectively as one
101
element of a holistic admissions process.
Minority applicants did
not all receive the same benefit and race was considered along with

95
96
97
98

99

100
101

Sunstein, supra note 94, at 1902.
Id. at 1901.
Id.
See Gerken, supra note 6, at 104 (characterizing Justices Powell and O’Connor’s views as
“something akin to a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach to race-conscious decisionmaking:
use race, but don’t be obvious about it” (internal citation omitted)).
See Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 TUL. L. REV.
1941, 1953 (2004) (arguing that in Grutter, “the Court was more concerned with how the
Law School’s application process actually appeared and the message that it sent to the
public than with its impact on any particular white applicant. In this way, Justice
O’Connor’s acceptance of the Law School’s application process in Grutter is consistent
with her rejection of the bizarrely shaped electoral districts in Shaw v. Reno. . . . In Grutter,
as in Shaw, the message communicated by the governmental action was paramount”).
Joshua Levine also notes that Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles may reduce stigmatic
harm. See Levine, supra note 88, at 520 (“[I]f race truly is ‘one of many’ factors and acts
only as a small ‘plus’—such that the applicant and others can never really know whether
race played a role in one’s admission, then it is possible the stigmatic harm would be reduced.”). However, Levine’s definition of “stigmatic harm” is broader than the one
posed in this Article, as it encompasses tangible harm to minority applicants. See supra
Part II.B.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003). (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all
the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. . . . Unlike
the program at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger . . . the Law School awards no mechanical, predetermined diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race or ethnicity.” (internal citations omitted)).
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other factors to determine its place in the overall evaluation. Grutter’s requirements for a narrowly tailored, holistic admissions program—individualized review, flexible use of race, consideration of
factors other than race, preference for race-neutral alternatives, and
“sunset” provisions to gradually phase out race-conscious policies—all
reflect a principle of minimizing stigmatic harm. Grutter held that
“truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a
103
flexible, nonmechanical way.” The decision contemplates that race
will be considered as a “plus” factor only in the context of a given ap104
plicant’s other characteristics, and individualized review of all applicants is required to determine if and how race should serve as a
105
“plus factor.” These provisions serve to minimize stigmatic harm by
ensuring that beyond the holistic, individually variable consideration
of race, minority students are not treated differently than non106
minority students. Grutter also requires colleges and universities to
undertake “good faith” consideration of race-neutral alternatives to
107
the race-conscious admissions policy, and to periodically review the

102

103
104

105
106

107

Id. at 336–37. (“When using race as a ‘plus’ factor in university admissions, a university’s
admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount.”) See Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (identifying the “denial . . . of th[e] right to individualized consideration” as the “principal evil” of the medical school’s admissions program).
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 334.
Id. at 337 (“[T]he Law School’s race-conscious admissions program adequately ensures
that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered
alongside race in admissions decisions.”).
Id. at 334 (“Universities can . . . consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor
in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”).
Cf. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 928 (1983) (“The indirectness of the
less explicitly numerical systems may have significant advantages, not so much in terms of
the processes of consideration as in the felt impact of their operation over time. The description of race as simply ‘another factor’ among a lot of others considered in seeking
diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority students are separate and different
and the recipients of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and structured systems might have the opposite effect.). Professor Mishkin focused here on advantages of the perception that race is used in a flexible, individualized manner. In contrast, this Article focuses on advantages of actually using race in such a manner.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does . . . require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university
seeks.”).
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108

policy to determine if it is still necessary. Here, Grutter recognized
that any preferential treatment based on race creates stigmatic harm
109
and should be phased out eventually.
In these ways, Grutter’s mandate that “[t]he importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admis110
sions program is paramount” was consistent with the view in Croson
111
and Shaw that “individual worth” should predominate over race.
While the cases differ in that the former upheld a race-conscious policy and the latter two did not, all of them reflect a broader principle
of avoiding or minimizing stigmatic harm.
Scholarly analysis has generally not examined this aspect of Grut112
ter —probably because Grutter did not strike down a race-conscious
policy, and because some commentators view Grutter’s narrow tailor113
ing provisions as a smokescreen that merely hides racial quotas, or
at least serves mainly to hide the use of race rather than to ensure
114
that race is actually used in a flexible, individualized manner. Part
IV will discuss how courts can review race-conscious policies more
stringently under Grutter.
2. Least Restrictive Means as the “Least Stigmatic Means”
Professors Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster provide another critique
of Grutter’s narrow tailoring requirements. They argue that the Grutter ruling deviated from prior constitutional doctrine requiring government use of suspect classifications to employ the “least restrictive

108

109
110
111
112

113

114

Id. at 342 (“In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by
sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine
whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”).
Id.
Id. at 337.
See supra notes 86 and 89, and accompanying text.
But see Levine, supra note 88, at 520 (noting how Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles may
reduce the stigma associated with race-conscious policies); Adams, supra note 99, at 1953
(noting that “[i]nGrutter [. . .] the message communicated by the governmental action
was paramount”).
See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 25, at 2048. In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy expresses a
similar view. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he concept of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”). This Article only aims to articulate the theory underlying Grutter and to apply this
theory to Fisher v. University of Texas. The Article takes no position on whether the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy actually adhered to this theory based
on the facts in Grutter.
See supra notes 98 and 106, and accompanying text.
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115

[means].”
In their view, narrow tailoring of race-conscious admissions policies should require the “minimum necessary preference” to
116
achieve sufficient diversity. Part V will discuss these issues further.
Professor Ayres and Foster also contend that the Grutter admissions plan gave more weight to race than the plan struck down in
117
Gratz, and thus did not employ the “minimum necessary prefer118
ence.”
Assuming that Professor Ayres and Foster are correct in
their assessment of weight given to race, one can posit that under
Grutter, stigmatic harm is not determined solely by the weight of race
119
preferences (although that is a factor), but also by the manner in
which those preferences are applied. A flexible, holistic admissions
process with individualized review creates less stigmatic harm than a
fixed-weight point system, even if the latter gives less overall weight to
race, because flexibility and individualized review ensure—to the
greatest extent possible—that all applicants from a given group will
120
not be treated exactly the same merely because of their race. Pro-

115

116
117

118
119

120

Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 523 n.28 (citing Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that state action which employs “‘suspect classifications’ is
to be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available”). Ayres
and Foster concede that “[s]ome older cases include language suggesting that strict scrutiny does not demand use of the least restrictive means[,]” but they contend that “[i]n
light of more recent cases demanding consideration of race-neutral alternatives and applying a stricter version of strict scrutiny, however, these cases are no longer good law
with respect to this point.” Id. Nevertheless, for a different view of narrow tailoring, see
Jeb Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 438 (1997) (noting that strict scrutiny
in recent equal protection jurisprudence can be viewed as “a cost-benefit justificatory
test . . . [which] would serve to determine whether a law that causes acknowledged constitutional harms is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitutionally
costly . . . law could not have achieved”).
Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 521.
Id. at 534 (concluding that “the Law School placed more weight on race than the College”). See also infra Part V.B.2 (discussing weight given to race in admissions as a limiting
principle for race-conscious admissions policies).
See Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 521.
This Article builds on Professors Pildes and Niemi’s analysis of stigmatic harm by arguing
that the stigmatic harm associated with government use of race accrues not only when
race has too dominant a role, but also when it is used in a manner that promotes stereotyping by treating all of individuals of the same race in exactly the same way (e.g., by using a mechanical point system such as the one struck down in Gratz). Grutter essentially
prioritizes the latter concern over the former. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
As noted earlier, some commentators, including Justice Kennedy, claim that Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles allow universities to hide their use of quotas and point systems
under the guise of holistic admissions. See supra notes 25 and 113, and accompanying
text. To the extent this is true, courts must be more vigilant in enforcing Grutter’s narrow
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fessor Ayres and Foster do acknowledge that narrow tailoring inquiry
121
can vary by context, and in this context, the Grutter majority created
a least stigmatic means principle—a standard that defines narrow tailoring in terms of minimizing the stigmatic harm of race-conscious ad122
missions policies.
C. Within-Group Diversity and Grutter’s Internal Logic
Critical mass and Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles are essentially two sides of the same coin, and considering them together shows
the internal logic and coherence of the Grutter opinion. A critical
mass of minority students, which includes sufficient diversity of viewpoints and experiences within each racial group, facilitates the educational benefits of diversity that Grutter held as a compelling interest:
breaking down racial stereotypes and promoting cross-racial under123
standing and dialogue.
Grutter recognized that these benefits are
tangible and important, and that race-conscious admissions policies
are necessary to attain them.
At the same time, however, Grutter recognized the stigmatic harm
of using race-conscious admissions policies and how they could reinforce the very stereotypes that a critical mass of viewpoints and experiences was intended to break down. Thus, Grutter’s narrow tailoring
principles aim to reduce stereotyping within the admissions process
by minimizing stigmatic harm and requiring that applicants be reviewed on an individual basis. This is why Grutter mandates that race
be used in a flexible, rather than a mechanical, manner. Even
though race-conscious policies can be employed, it is paramount that
they not treat all applicants of the same racial group in exactly the
124
same manner.
Grutter’s other narrow tailoring requirements, in-

121

122
123
124

tailoring principles, and emphasizing within-group diversity aids in this process. See infra
Parts II.C. and IV.
Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 519 (“[T]he narrow tailoring requirement has always had
multiple dimensions.”). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003)
(“[T]he contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry with respect to race-conscious university
admissions programs . . . must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of
race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education.”). Ayres and Foster
themselves acknowledge that the “narrow tailoring requirement has always had multiple
dimensions[.]” Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 519.
Part IV.C.2., infra, reconciles the least restrictive means and least stigmatic means theories
of narrow tailoring.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
See supra Part II.B.
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125

cluding its “sunset” requirement, also aim to reduce and eventually
eliminate stigmatic harm.
When viewed together, critical mass and the least stigmatic means
principle of narrow tailoring represent Grutter’s balance between the
educational benefits of diversity and the stigmatic harm of race126
conscious policies.
In fact, if properly implemented, Grutter’s narrow tailoring provisions inherently facilitate the admission of a critical mass of perspectives and experiences within racial groups. Unlike
a racial quota, numerical goal/range, or a Gratz-type point system, a
critical mass cannot be attained merely by identifying an applicant’s
race and mechanically using this information. A holistic admissions
process—which includes individualized review, considers race in a
flexible manner, and uses diversity factors other than race—is necessary to yield a critical mass that includes diversity within racial groups.
By definition, achieving such within-group diversity reduces stigmatic
harm, because it requires admissions committees to consider factors
besides race and to treat applicants of the same race differently based
127
on non-racial factors. These were precisely the concerns expressed
128
in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent.
125

126

127

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in
time. . . . In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by
sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine
whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”).
See Adams, supra note 99, at 1953 (noting that “the balancing performed by Justice
O’Connor in the Grutter case is as an example of cost-benefit balancing between societal
harms and societal benefits”); Rubenfeld, supra note 115, at 438 (noting that strict scrutiny in recent equal protection jurisprudence can be viewed as “a cost-benefit justificatory
test . . . [which] . . . serve[s] to determine whether a law that causes acknowledged constitutional harms is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitutionally
costly . . . law could not have achieved”). Professor Reva Siegal articulates the principle of
antibalkanization in equal protection jurisprudence, which similarly balances the costs and
benefits of race conscious policies. See Reva B. Siegal, From Colorblindness to Antibalkination: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 Yale L.J. 1278, 1299 (2011)
(noting that “Justice O’Connor interprets equal protection so as to promote social cohesion and to avoid racial arrangements that balkanize and threaten social cohesion. Concern with balkanization thus supplies affirmative reason to allow affirmative action and to
limit it . . .”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309. (“The Law School’s admissions program . . . is flexible enough to
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race
or ethnicity the defining feature of the application. . . . The Law School engages in a
highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration
to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.
There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on
any single ‘soft’ variable . . . . Also, the program adequately ensures that all factors that
may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race.”) See also Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003) (noting that “Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke emphasized the importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual, as-
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D. Standards of Review in Grutter: The Need for Deference to Universities
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter also contends that the Grutter
129
majority abandoned strict scrutiny and critiques the majority for its
130
deference to the Law School.
The Grutter opinion does delineate
multiple standards of review, deferring to universities’ “good faith”
that racial diversity is necessary to attain educational benefits, while
still applying strict scrutiny (the “least stigmatic means”) to evaluate
131
the manner in which race is used (or at least claiming to do so).
The “good faith” standard with respect to the educational benefits of
diversity is a natural consequence of the analysis presented earlier:
because critical mass is a complex entity and cannot be measured accurately by courts, universities are in the best position to determine
the level and type of diversity needed to fulfill their educational missions. Grutter also cites the Supreme Court’s “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within consti-

128

129
130
131

sessing all of the qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual’s ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education”). For an example of
how the Supreme Court envisioned this would work, see Gratz, 244 U.S. at 272–73
(“[I]nstructive in our consideration . . . is the example . . . which Justice Powell both discussed in, and attached to, his opinion in Bakke. The example was included to ‘illustrate
the kind of significance attached to race’ . . . [i]t provided as follows: ‘The Admissions
Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between A,
the child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semiliterate parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding interest in black power. If a good
number of black students much like A but few like B had already been admitted, the
Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality might give
him an edge over both A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities
or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it.” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978))).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve
diversity . . .”). Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter stemmed from his belief, based on the
facts, that the University of Michigan School of Law did use race as a predominant factor.
Id. at 389 (noting that at the University of Michigan School of Law, “race is likely outcome determinative for many members of minority groups”). He further noted that “an
educational institution must ensure, through sufficient procedures, that each applicant
receives individual consideration and that race does not become a predominant factor in
the admissions decisionmaking.” Id. at 393.
Id. at 387 (contending that “[t]he Court . . . does not apply strict scrutiny” in Grutter).
Id. at 394 (“Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.”).
Id. at 326 (Opinion of the Court) (noting that the Court has “held that all racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny’”). But see supra notes 129–30, and accompanying text (Justice Kennedy stating that
the Grutter majority did not apply strict scrutiny).
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132

tutionally prescribed limits[,]” particularly with respect to “complex
educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the exper133
tise of the university.” Thus, both pragmatic and doctrinal reasons
exist for deferring to universities’ judgment on the educational benefits of diversity.
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent takes strong issue
with such deference, critiquing the majority for being “satisfied by the
134
Law School’s profession of its own good faith.” This aspect of Grutter is likely to be modified or overturned when the Supreme Court
decides Fisher. Part IV of this Article proposes a more nuanced, alternative interpretation of Grutter’s deference and judicial review provisions—one that addresses Justice Kennedy’s concerns as applied to
Fisher.
In sum, this Part has illustrated how critical mass and Grutter’s
least stigmatic means theory of narrow tailoring encompass diversity
within groups. Within-group diversity is relevant to the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions for several reasons: 1. It distinguishes critical mass from racial quotas and numerical goals; 2. It facilitates the educational benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter; 3.
It reduces the stigmatic harm of race-conscious policies; and 4. It clarifies the need for courts’ deference to universities with respect to admissions policies. Moreover, as the analysis of Fisher in the subsequent Parts will illustrate, race-conscious admissions policies may be
used not only to increase numbers of minority students, but also specifically to target particular subgroups of minority students in order
to increase diversity within racial groups.

132
133

134

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
Id. See also id. at 329. (“We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of
public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition. . . . In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded
in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy: ‘The freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.’. . . From this
premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select those students who
will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas,’ a university seek[s] to achieve a
goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.’” (quoting Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1977))). Bakke, 385 U.S. at 319 n.53 (Powell,
J., concurring) (“Universities . . . may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic
background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose. So long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is
no warrant for judicial interference in the academic process.”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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III. FISHER V. TEXAS, CRITICAL MASS, AND DEFERENCE TO UNIVERSITIES
Part II illustrated the internal logic and theoretical coherence of
Grutter’s various components. This Part discusses the application of
“critical mass” in Fisher v. Texas and the Fifth Circuit panel’s deference to UT in determining whether it had enrolled a “critical mass.”
It then presents a critique of the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion on these bases, setting the stage for the proposed alternative method to decide Fisher.
A. Overview
135

Fisher v. University of Texas is the Supreme Court’s first oppor136
In order to undertunity to clarify Grutter’s critical mass concept.
stand Fisher, it is necessary to briefly review the University of Texas’s
changing undergraduate admissions policy and provide historical
137
context for the case.
1. Hopwood v. Texas and the Top Ten Percent Law
138

Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas, the
University of Texas (“UT”) used a variety of race-conscious admissions procedures, and in the fall of 1993, these resulted in an incoming freshman class that was 4.5% African American and 15.6% Lati139
na/o. In 1996, Hopwood outlawed the use of race-conscious policies
in the Fifth Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi), and as a result, for fall of 1997, the African American enrollment in the incoming class dropped to 2.7% and the Latina/o enrollment dropped to

135
136

137
138
139

631 F.3d 213, 246 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding the University of Texas at Austin’s raceconscious undergraduate admissions policy).
In Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), the
Court did consider and strike down race-conscious assignment plans for public schools,
but the definition of critical mass was not a factor in the Court’s decision. In fact, the
Court distinguished these assignment plans from the holistic admissions policy upheld in
Grutter. Id. at 705. (“In Grutter, the number of minority students the school sought to
admit was an undefined ‘meaningful number’ necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse
student body . . . and the Court concluded that the law school did not count back from its
applicant pool to arrive at that number[.] . . . Here, in contrast, the schools worked
backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from
some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits. This is
a fatal flaw under the Court’s existing precedent.”).
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 222–31 (describing the history of changes in the University of Texas at
Austin undergraduate admissions policy).
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 223.
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140

12.6%. In response, the Texas legislature passed the Top Ten Per141
cent Law, which guaranteed admission to any Texas state university
to Texas public high school seniors in the top ten percent of their
142
class.
This law was intended to increase minority representation
143
By
without directly using race as part of the admissions process.
2004, partly as a result of the Top Ten Percent Law, the percentage of
African Americans in the incoming class had increased to 4.5% and
144
the percentage of Latina/os increased to 16.9%.
2. Post-Grutter Return of Race-Conscious Admissions
With the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter, Hopwood was
overturned, and race-conscious admissions policies, in accordance
with Grutter’s principles, were once again permissible in Texas to enroll a critical mass of underrepresented minority students. UT conducted a series of studies to determine whether it was enrolling a critical mass and concluded that it was not. One study found that of
classes with ten to twenty-four students at UT, 89% had zero to one
African American student, 41% had zero to one Asian American student, and 37% had zero to one Latina/o student. Another study
which surveyed undergraduate students found that a majority felt
that there was “insufficient minority representation” for the “full
145
benefits of diversity to occur,” and that minority students reported
146
feeling isolated.
In response, UT created a new, multifaceted admissions policy
which significantly increased the enrollment of African American and
Latina/o students, and also of Asian American students in the next
147
few years. The vast majority of African American and Latina/o students were admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, which was still
in effect, as were over 80% of total admitted students to the Universi140
141

142
143

144
145
146
147

Id. at 224.
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (2009). In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended
“to cap the number of students guaranteed admission at UT Austin to 75% of the seats
available to Texas residents.” Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 n.56.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
Id. (“The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms admit students on the basis of race,
but underrepresented minorities were its announced target and their admission a large, if
not primary, purpose.”).
Id. Part of this increase may have been due to demographic changes in the state of Texas. Id. at 226.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 226. It is possible that some of these increases were due in part to demographic
changes in the state of Texas. Id.
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148

ty of Texas. The rest of the class was admitted on the basis of two
measures: 1. Academic Index—a formula that predicts first year GPA
149
based on high school class rank and standardized test scores; and 2.
Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”)—based on holistic evaluation of
an applicant’s entire file, including essays and a personal achievement score which factors in extracurricular activities, family and socioeconomic background, academic achievement as related to these
150
variables, and race.
The PAI is a numerical score based on ratings by admissions staff
members, but consistent with the Gratz/Grutter framework, it does not
151
attach a specific weight to race in the application process. The PAI
was the only “race-conscious” element of the new UT admissions
plan.
3. Plaintiffs’ Claim
152

Plaintiffs Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz were both denied admission to the University of Texas for the entering class of fall
2008 and filed suit, alleging that UT’s race-conscious admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the Plaintiffs
claimed that the race-conscious aspects of the UT admissions policy
were unwarranted because a “race-neutral” policy, the Top Ten Percent Law, had already yielded a critical mass of African American and
148

149
150
151

152

Id. at 229. In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended “to cap the number of students guaranteed admission at UT Austin to 75% of the seats available to Texas residents.” Id. at 224 n.56.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 227–28.
Id. at 228. Also noteworthy is the fact that any applicant, of any race, could benefit from
UT’s race-conscious admissions policy:
[R]ace can enhance the personal achievement score of a student from any racial
background, including whites and Asian-Americans. For example, a white student
who has demonstrated substantial community involvement at a predominantly
Hispanic high school may contribute a unique perspective that produces a greater
personal achievement score than a similarly situated Hispanic student from the
same school. This possibility is the point of Grutter’s holistic and individualized assessments, which must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant.” Indeed, just as
in Grutter, UT applicants of every race may submit supplemental information to
highlight their potential diversity contributions, which allows students who are diverse in unconventional ways to describe their unique attributes.
Id. at 236 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
This Article will refer to the parties who brought Fisher as the “Plaintiffs,” although the
Fisher opinion sometimes refers to them as “Appellants” or “Plaintiffs-Appellants.” The
Plaintiffs were also the “Petitioner” at the Supreme Court (where Abigail Noel Fisher was
the only remaining Plaintiff). See Brief of Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (2012) (No.
11-345). For purposes of this Article, all of these terms are interchangeable.
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Latina/o students without the additional race-conscious measure (the
153
Personal Achievement Index). Thus, the issue in Fisher is different
154
155
156
157
All of those
than that in Bakke, Hopwood, Gratz, and Grutter.
earlier cases were brought by Plaintiffs who claimed that their grades
and standardized test scores would have almost certainly garnered
them admission if they had been a member of a designated racial/ethnic group (usually Black or Latina/o). The Plaintiffs in Fisher, in contrast, did not argue that UT would have admitted them but
158
for the race-conscious policy. Rather, they contended that UT had
achieved sufficient diversity—a critical mass of underrepresented mi159
nority students—through its race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law.
Consequently, given Grutter’s preference for race-neutral alternatives,
the Plaintiffs argued that UT could not use a race-conscious admis160
sions plan.
4. Fifth Circuit Ruling in Fisher
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas,
in a ruling by Judge Sam Sparks, rejected the Plaintiffs’ arguments
161
and granted summary judgment to UT. A three judge panel of the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling and elaborated upon several of the
issues presented. The Fifth Circuit majority opinion in Fisher, by
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, framed Grutter as “holding that diversity, including seeking a critical mass of minority students, is ‘a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admis-

153
154
155
156
157
158

159

160

161

Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213, (No. 09-50822).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277.
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996).
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251–52 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316–17 (2003).
See Brown-Nagin, supra note 7, at 115 (“Fisher does not claim that racial consideration . . .
necessarily doomed her prospects. No evidence supports that position. The record
shows that a total of 216 black and Latino applicants gained acceptance to UT through
holistic review in 2008, when Fisher unsuccessfully applied to UT. The plaintiff concedes
that race played no role in the admission of 183 of those 216 students . . . [t]he record is
inconclusive on whether [the remaining] thirty-three black and Latino students benefitted from race.”).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex, 631 F.3d 213, 234 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that Plaintiffs “question
whether UT needs a Grutter-like policy . . . [because] UT’s minority enrollment under the
Top Ten Percent Law already surpassed critical mass . . . .”).
See id. (“[Plaintiffs] do not allege that UT’s race-conscious admissions policy is functionally different from, or gives greater consideration to race than, the policy upheld in Grutter.
Rather, [Plaintiffs] question whether UT needs a Grutter-like policy.”).
Fisher, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (denying motion for preliminary injunction).
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162

sions.’”
The Fifth Circuit panel rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument
that UT’s admissions policy amounts to racial balancing because it
163
The panel
focuses on demographically underrepresented groups.
noted that demographics were only considered in assessing the initial
need for a race-conscious policy, not during the actual admissions
164
165
process.
Applying a “good faith” standard, the panel also deferred to UT’s judgment that race-conscious policies were still necessary to attain a critical mass and actualize the educational benefits of
diversity. Judge Higginbotham’s opinion, along with the concurrence by Judge Emilio Garza, both found that UT’s admissions policy
was consistent with Grutter, although in dicta, Judge Garza expounded
166
upon his disdain for Grutter. Also in dicta, Judge Higginbotham was
very critical of the Top Ten Percent Law, stating that it excluded well
qualified minority students who attended more competitive high
schools, and that it threatened to make UT’s race-conscious policies
167
unnecessary and unconstitutional.
In June 2011, by a narrow vote of 9-7, the Fifth Circuit denied the
168
Chief Judge
Plaintiffs’ request for a rehearing of Fisher en banc.
Edith Jones authored a dissenting opinion, joined by four other
169
judges. Chief Judge Jones’s critiques of Judge Higginbotham’s Fisher opinion were threefold. First, Chief Judge Jones contended that
Fisher essentially abrogates strict scrutiny by replacing Grutter’s narrow
170
tailoring inquiry with a “good faith” standard.
Additionally, Judge
Jones’s dissent found that the minimal impact of UT’s race-conscious
policy—the fact that over 80% of students are admitted through the
race-neutral Top Ten Percent plan—calls into question whether the
race-conscious policy is necessary to attain the educational benefits of

162
163
164
165

166
167
168
169
170

Fisher, 631 F.3d at 219 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325).
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 235–36.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 233 (“[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university’s good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures
are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including attaining critical
mass in minority enrollment.”).
Id. at 247 (Garza, J., specially concurring) (stating that “Grutter represents a digression in
the course of constitutional law”).
See infra Part III.B.3.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (denying en banc rehearing).
Id. at 303 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Jones contended that the court “may presume a university’s good faith in the
decision that it has a compelling interest in achieving racial and other student diversity.
But that is as about as far as deference should go.” Id. at 305 n.3.
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171

diversity. Finally, Chief Judge Jones contended that the application
of critical mass at the classroom level “offers no stopping point for ra172
Under Fisher, a college or university could use
cial preferences.”
lack of representation of minorities in any class or major as justification for a race-conscious policy, and this emphasis on diversity at the
classroom level “offers no ground for serious judicial review of a ter173
minus of the racial preference policy.”
The Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
174
States Supreme Court, which after several delays, the Court granted
on February 21, 2012. The question presented in Fisher is as follows:
“Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of
171

172

173
174

For a counterargument to Chief Judge Jones’s contention here, see infra Part V.C.2 (arguing that a race-conscious admissions policy could be useful in attaining within-group diversity even if it only affects small numbers of students, because it is the novel and diverse
perspectives those students bring, not their small numbers, that ties the race-conscious
policies to the educational benefits of diversity). In fact, race-conscious policies with a
smaller impact are preferable because they create less stigmatic harm. Moreover, as institutions gradually phase out race-conscious policies in accordance with Grutter’s sunset requirement, one should expect a gradual reduction in their impact. See infra Part V.C.3.
Fisher, 644 F.3d at 307. Chief Justice Roberts also raised this issue in the Fisher oral argument at the Supreme Court. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 46 (asking
UT’s counsel “[w]hat is the logical end point [to your use of race]?”). See also BrownNagin, supra note 7, at 126 (noting that some Justices “might find the appellant’s plea for
an upper limit on critical mass—a ceiling and a firm endpoint—appealing. Without
some concrete foundation for critical mass, Texas’s pursuit of the right mix of underrepresented students arguably is limitless and would permit consideration of race in
perpetuity”). The “ceiling” and the “endpoint” here are actually different concepts, and
the term “stopping point” in Chief Judge Jones’ dissent could have two different meanings: 1. The “ceiling”: A limiting principle on the weight of race in the admissions process. This is discussed infra in Part V.B.; or 2. The “end point”: the termination of raceconscious policies altogether, in accordance with Grutter’s preference for race-neutral policies and its “sunset” provision. Part V.C.3 infra discusses how race preferences can be
gradually phased out.
Fisher, 644 F.3d at 307.
On September 15, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, 644 F.3d 301 (No. 11-345). UT
did not file a response brief, and the Supreme Court requested a response from UT by
November 30, 2011, later extending that deadline until December 7, 2011. See Lyle Denniston, Affirmative Action Case Develops, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 1, 2011, 5:05 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/affirmative-action-case-develops/. UT then filed
its response, arguing against certiorari largely on inappropriate vehicle grounds. See Brief
in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, 644 F.3d 301 (No. 11-345). The
Court was first scheduled to consider the cert petition in conference on January 13, 2012,
and then deferred consideration to its January 20 conference, and then again until the
February 3 conference, before finally granting certiorari on February 21. See Fisher v.
Texas Docket, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?
FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
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175

race in undergraduate admissions decisions.” The Supreme Court
176
heard oral arguments in Fisher on October 10, 2012, and the
Court’s ruling should occur in early 2013.
B. Critical Mass as Applied in Fisher
Fisher v. Texas represents the first post-Grutter litigation on affirmative action in higher education to apply the critical mass concept.
The arguments in Fisher with respect to critical mass focused mainly
on numbers and percentages of minority students. While the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion espoused a more comprehensive definition of “critical mass,” its analysis was also based largely on numbers.
1. Plaintiffs’ View of Critical Mass
The Fisher Plaintiffs’ analysis of critical mass focused solely on
campus-wide numbers of minority students. They argued that 21.4%
minority (African American and Latina/o) enrollment at UT was a
sufficient critical mass, noting that in Grutter, the University of Michigan School of Law only attained 13.5% to 20.1% minority enrollment
177
The Plaintiffs argued that the
in the years preceding the lawsuit.
concept of critical mass is defined as “sufficient number of underrepresented minority students such that such minority students
178
would ‘not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.’” The
Fifth Circuit panel purported to reject this view and was clear in noting that critical mass did not refer to “any fixed number.”
2. UT and Fifth Circuit Panel’s View of Critical Mass
The University of Texas had described critical mass in more abstract terms such as “meaningful representation”; however, the University’s argument also centered on numbers. UT argued that: 1.
The Plaintiffs improperly combined African Americans and Lati-

175
176
177

178

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc denied), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345).
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 243. The Plaintiffs also argued “that minority enrollment at UT now
exceeds the level it had reached in the mid-1990s, pre-Hopwood, when the University was
free to obtain any critical mass it wanted through overtly race-based decisions.” Id. at 244.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822). See also Fisher, 631
F.3d at 243 (noting that the Plaintiffs contend that “the concept of critical mass is defined
by the minimum threshold for minority students to have their ideas represented in class
discussions and not to feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”).
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179

na/os for purposes of assessing critical mass; and 2. In any case, critical mass had not been attained within the student body or at the
180
“classroom level.”
To support this argument, UT noted that a large percentage of its
seminar classes, with ten to twenty-four students, had only zero or one
181
Black, Latino, and/or Asian American student. These small classes
are presumably the classroom settings where racial stereotypes could
be broken down and cross-racial understanding could be fostered,
and unless there are at least two students of any group, there cannot
be diverse perspectives represented from that group. In that sense,
diversity within racial groups was implicit in UT’s concept of critical
182
mass, although not stated directly.
UT’s response may have been a simple legal strategy for the lower
court case, as it directly refuted the Plaintiffs’ claims in the clearest
and simplest manner possible, and it provided a more nuanced view
of “critical mass.” Nevertheless, it did not fully articulate how withingroup diversity has its own benefits and relates to the critical mass
183
concept, and it did not clearly distinguish critical mass from numer179

180

181

182

183

Brief of Appellees at 46, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822) (“Plaintiffs . . . commit the
fatal error of combining two different groups of underrepresented minorities in order to
determine critical mass.”).
See id. at 48–49 (arguing that UT’s classroom study “provides a dramatic illustration of the
absence of diversity on campus at UT prior to 2005 . . . [and] . . . only further dramatized . . . that UT lacked sufficient diversity, including a critical mass of minority students,
across the entire student body . . .”).
See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225 (“According to [UT’s study of classroom diversity], 90% of these
smaller classes in Fall 2002 had either one or zero African-American students, 46% had
one or zero Asian-American students, and 43% had one or zero Hispanic students.” (internal citations omitted)). Presumably, UT omitted the smallest classes—those with fewer
than ten students—because they would be statistically unlikely to have more than zero or
one students from various minority groups even if the number of minority students increased significantly.
Judge Sam Sparks’s district court opinion in Fisher also suggests this point. See Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602–03 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (“Critical mass, which is an
adequate representation of minority students to assure educational benefits deriving from
diversity, affects in a positive way all students because they learn that there is not ‘one’
minority or majority view. . . . [T]here is a compelling educational interest for the University not to have large numbers of classes in which there are no students—or only a single
student—of a given underrepresented race or ethnicity.”).
In its brief to the Supreme Court, UT does note that “[p]etitioner completely overlooks
the diversity within racial groups that UT’s holistic plan fosters.” Brief for Respondents at
20, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (2012) (No. 11-345). UT’s Supreme Court brief also asserts
that “[h]olistic review permits the consideration of diversity within racial groups.” Id. at
33. However, UT does not elaborate upon this idea or analyze it in depth, as this Article
does. Additionally, the amicus brief for the Society of American Law Teachers, supporting UT and citing a draft of this Article, notes that Black and Latino students admitted
under UT’s race-conscious policy “could contribute to diversity in various ways.” See Brief
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184

ical goals at the classroom level. Part V infra will discuss some other
ways in which the goal of attaining diversity within racial groups
might be used to justify a race-conscious admissions policy.
Judge Higginbotham’s Fisher opinion noted that the Supreme
Court in Grutter was divided over the meaning of “critical mass,” but it
cited Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, which defined “critical
mass” through “reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
185
designed to produce.” The Fifth Circuit panel defined these benefits in broad terms: 1. “Increased Perspectives”—those brought by diverse groups of students into the classroom, which add valuable
knowledge and make for engaging classroom discussions; 2. “Professionalism”—preparing students for “work and citizenship” by exposing them to diverse people and viewpoints; and 3. “Civic Engagement”—creating paths to leadership for individuals of every race and
186
ethnicity.
However, the Fifth Circuit did not apply this definition
further; it merely adopted UT’s view of critical mass at the classroom
level.
3. Judge Higginbotham’s Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law
Beyond the ruling in Fisher, Judge Higginbotham’s analysis of the
Top Ten Percent Law illustrates the need to understand critical mass
in terms of within-group diversity. The other Fifth Circuit panel
judges did not join this part of Judge Higginbotham’s opinion, which
stated that the Top Ten Percent Law “threatens to erode the founda187
tions UT relies on to justify implementing Grutter polices . . . .”
Judge Higginbotham noted that the Top Ten Percent Law did lead to
an increase in minority enrollment, and that by 2008, 81% of incoming in-state students at UT were admitted via the Top Ten Percent
188
Law.
As a consequence, the opinion contended that the Top Ten
Percent Law precluded UT from admitting minority students who
went to more competitive schools but did not finish in the top ten

184

185
186

187
188

of Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., No. 11-345 (Aug. 13, 2012).
UT argued that it “[d]id [n]ot [a]rticulate a [r]igid, [n]umerical [d]efinition of [c]ritical
[m]ass.” Brief of Appellees at 34, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822). However, while its
definition may not have been “rigid,” UT did not show how critical mass could be defined
in any terms other numerical goals or ranges. See also infra Part III.D.1.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 219.
Id. at 219–20. The Fifth Circuit panel also did not discuss the breakdown of racial stereotypes in classrooms, which was the specific educational benefit that Grutter cited at the
classroom level. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text; infra Part III.D.2.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242.
Id. at 227.
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percent of their graduating classes, and who could contribute to di189
Judge Higginbotham referred to the Top
versity in various ways.
Ten Percent Law as “a polar opposite of the holistic focus upon individuals” which was sanctioned by Grutter, and noted that “its internal
proxies for race end-run the Supreme Court’s studied structure for
190
use of race in university admissions decisions.” Further, he opined:
“[T]he University does not respond to the reality that the Top Ten
Percent Law eliminated the consideration of test scores, and correspondingly reduced academic selectivity, to produce increased enrollment of minorities. Such costs may be intrinsic to affirmative action plans. If so, Grutter at least sought to minimize those costs
through narrow tailoring. The Top Ten Percent Law is anything but
191
narrow.”
Thus, in spite of ruling in favor of the University, Judge Higginbotham also concluded that “[a]ppellants are correct that the decision to [enact the Top Ten Percent Law] . . . places at risk UT’s
192
race-conscious admissions policies.” Part III.D.4. presents a critique
of Judge Higginbotham’s analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law’s effect
on the constitutionality of race-conscious policies.
C. Deference to Universities in Fisher
The issue of deference to universities on determining whether
they had enrolled a critical mass of minority students was a contentious point in the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion, and it will be a major
issue when the Supreme Court considers the case. The question is
essentially what standard of review courts should apply when evaluating whether it is necessary for a university to use race-conscious admissions policies to attain the educational benefits of diversity. In the
Fisher litigation itself, the two standards debated were “strong basis in
193
194
evidence” and “good faith.”
189

190
191
192
193

Id. Unlike Judge Higginbotham, this Article argues that Grutter allows race-conscious policies to be used specifically to target the minority students noted here. See infra Part
V.A.2.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
For example, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court noted: “[I]n the context of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [t]he Court has held that certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are themselves based on
race—are constitutional only where there is a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial
actions were necessary.” 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 500 (1989) (noting same).
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1. Plaintiffs’ View of Deference
To determine whether a university needed to use race-conscious
admissions policies to attain the educational benefits of diversity, the
Fisher Plaintiffs argued that the Fifth Circuit should adopt a “strong
basis in evidence” standard, comparable to that used to evaluate the
necessity of remedial race-conscious policies in “public employment
195
and government contracting cases.”
This standard would place a
significantly higher burden on universities than the “good faith”
196
standard suggested in Grutter. The Fifth Circuit panel rejected this
197
argument.
194

195

196
197

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We take the Law School at its word
that it would ‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.”). See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317–18 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (presuming good faith of university officials with a facially neutral policy in the absence of a showing to the contrary). Justice Kennedy and Chief Judge Jones both view
such deference to universities as antithetical to strict scrutiny. See supra note 170 and infra
notes 248 & 276. Part IV infra considers the relationship between deference and strict
scrutiny.
See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 232 (“Appellants urge that Grutter did not extend such deference to
a university’s decision to implement a race-conscious admissions policy. Instead, they
maintain Grutter deferred only to the university’s judgment that diversity would have educational benefits, not to the assessment of whether the university has attained critical mass
of a racial group or whether race-conscious efforts are necessary to achieve that end . . . .
Appellants would have us borrow a more restrictive standard of review . . . in which the
Supreme Court ‘held that certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there is a
‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were necessary.’”). See also supra text
accompanying note 193 (discussing the “strong basis in evidence” standard).
See supra text accompanying notes 69 and 194.
Specifically, the Fisher Court held that:
The high standard for justifying the use of race in public employment decisions
responds to the reality that race used in a backward-looking attempt to remedy
past wrongs, without focus on individual victims, does not treat race as part of a
holistic consideration. In doing so, it touches the third rail of racial quotas.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 233. The Fisher panel also cited Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 noting that:
When scrutinizing two school districts’ race-conscious busing plans, the Court invoked Grutter’s ‘serious, good faith consideration’ standard, rather than the strongbasis-in-evidence standard that Appellants would have us apply. The Parents Involved Court never suggested that the school districts would be required to prove
their plans were meticulously supported by some particular quantum of specific
evidence. Rather, the Court struck down the school districts’ programs because
they pursued racial balancing and defined students based on racial group classifications, not on individual circumstances.
Id. at 233–34 (internal citations omitted). See also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion)
(“[W]orking backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working
forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported
benefits . . .[i]s a fatal flaw under the Court’s existing precedent.”).
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2. UT and Fifth Circuit Panel’s View of Deference
UT argued for a “good faith” standard to assess the need for race198
conscious admissions policies, citing Grutter’s deference to universi199
200
ties in choosing their student bodies.
As noted earlier, the Fifth
201
Circuit panel adopted this view, which was heavily criticized by
202
Chief Judge Jones in her dissent to the en banc denial.
D. Critiquing Fisher’s Approach to Critical Mass and Deference
There are several critiques of the application of critical mass and
deference to universities in Fisher, including those noted by Chief
203
Judge Jones in her dissent. Because the two issues, critical mass and
204
deference, are intricately linked in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, this
Section considers them together.
1. Focus on Numbers and Percentages
In spite of the Fifth Circuit panel’s elaborate articulation of diversity-related objectives in Fisher, and its claim that critical mass should
be defined in terms of the educational benefits of diversity, rather
205
than by numbers, the panel’s analysis focused largely on numbers.
It adopted UT’s notion of critical mass at the classroom level, but it
did not articulate any theory that would allow Fisher to be decided on
a basis other than whether a particular number or percentage of minority students were present at the classroom level. One might argue
that because it did not adopt any fixed number as a critical mass, Fish-

198

199
200
201

202
203
204
205

See Brief of Appellees at 25–26, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822) (arguing that given “a
university’s unique First Amendment rights[,] . . . universities are entitled to ‘a degree of
deference’—and a ‘presum[ption]’ of ‘good faith’—‘absent a showing to the contrary.’
Courts must therefore ‘defer’ to the considered judgment of admissions officials—and
must not interfere with their admissions policies and decisions—unless officials have acted unreasonably or in bad faith”).
Id. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29.
See supra Part III.A.4.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 233 (“Grutter teaches that so long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts
must afford a measure of deference to the university’s good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”).
See supra note 170.
See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
Essentially, the Fifth Circuit deferred to UT not only with respect to the need for raceconscious admissions policies, but also on the meaning of “critical mass.”
See supra notes 58 and 185–86 and accompanying text.
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er is not in conflict with Bakke’s proscription of numerical goals.
However, by its very conclusion that the numbers of minority students
in UT’s participatory-size classes did not constitute a critical mass, the
Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion implies that some number or percentage—perhaps having at least two Black, Latino, and Asian American
students in every class—would constitute a “critical mass.” If this is
the case, then that number or percentage effectively becomes a nu207
merical goal.
Fisher then runs dangerously close to Justice Kennedy’s concern that “critical mass is . . . used . . . to achieve numerical
208
goals indistinguishable from quotas.” And if there is no such theo209
retical goal, then Chief Judge Jones’s critique that Fisher offers no
210
meaningful ground for judicial review is valid.
2. Incomplete Consideration of the Educational Benefits of Diversity
As noted, Fisher discussed critical mass in terms of “the education211
al benefits that diversity is designed to produce,” and the Fifth Circuit stated these as: “Increased Perspectives,” “Professionalism,” and
212
The Grutter majority opinion was more nu“Civic Engagement.”
anced, specifically linking critical mass to the breakdown of racial stereotypes through classroom discussions—by exposing students to a
213
“variety of viewpoints” within each group.
While it also discussed
broad societal benefits, such as producing a diverse representation of
leaders, the Grutter majority delineated the classroom functions of
critical mass more directly than Fisher, and implicit in those functions

206
207

208
209
210
211
212
213

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37 and 55 and accompanying text. Professor Brown-Nagin notes that
“UT’s reliance on state population figures and classroom- and program-level racial diversity numbers as critical mass metrics is likely to elicit strong objection” and offers “an alternative critical mass benchmark: the proportion of underrepresented senior high
school students in Texas whom UT deems viable candidates for admission.” BrownNagin, supra note 7, at 118. This Article contends that any numerical benchmark for critical mass is likely to elicit objection from Justice Kennedy as a violation of Bakke and Grutter’s proscription on quotas and numerical goals. See supra note 30. See also supra Part I.A.
for a general critique of numerical critical mass benchmarks.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.D.3.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 219–20.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319–20 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn
there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”).
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was a notion of critical mass that included diversity within racial
214
groups.
This omission in Fisher is important because the breakdown of racial stereotypes is key to understanding why critical mass must include
diversity within racial groups, and why consideration of such within215
group diversity is important in applying Grutter’s principles.
3. Problematic Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law
Judge Higginbotham opined (not joined by the other members of
the three judge panel) that the Top Ten Percent Law, by increasing
the number of Black and Latino students, raises questions about the
216
need for further race-conscious policies.
As noted earlier, mere
numbers of minority students do not speak to the constitutionality of
a race-conscious policy. Grutter dictated that such policies are neces-

214

215

216

The Grutter Court grounded the need for a critical mass due to its crucial role in reducing
stereotypes, noting:
The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on ‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority
viewpoint on any issue.’ To the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes
is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. The Grutter Court also noted that a critical mass has other educational benefits:
[T]he Law School’s concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce. These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and
“enables students to better understand persons of different races.”
Id. at 330.
See supra Parts I.C. and II. As noted earlier, UT did allude to diversity within racial groups
in its Supreme Court brief. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. UT also noted the
breakdown of racial stereotypes in its Supreme Court brief. See infra note 281. In response, the Fisher Plaintiffs critiqued UT’s argument as “a newly minted interest in elitism
dressed up as ‘intra-racial’ diversity.” Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. (2012) (No. 11-345). The Fisher Plaintiffs further contended that “UT’s preference
for elite minorities has nothing to do with the interest [the Supreme] Court found compelling in Grutter . . . .” Id. at 14. Of course, this Article disagrees with the Fisher Plaintiffs’
assessment. See supra Parts I.C. and II.C. Moreover, the principle of within-group diversity as a compelling interest would not always or even usually lead to admission of more
privileged minority students. At elite private universities, where there are no percentage
plans and where most admitted minority students are from privileged backgrounds, this
principle would dictate the admission of more underprivileged minorities to attain diversity within racial groups. See supra note 8 and infra note 283.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 243. (“Appellants are correct that the decision to [enact the Top Ten
Percent Law] . . . places at risk UT’s race-conscious admissions policies.”). This Article
does not endorse or critique the Top Ten Percent Law as a policy. Rather, it merely contends that Judge Higginbotham’s assertion that the Top Ten Percent Law “places at risk”
UT’s race-conscious policy is erroneous.
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sary to attain diversity within racial groups and break down racial ste217
reotypes, not to attain any particular number of minority students.
Moreover, as the Fisher panel itself recognized, minority students
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law disproportionately enroll
in certain schools and majors, and are underrepresented in other ma218
jors.
Judge Higginbotham’s conclusion stated precisely why UT’s
race-conscious policy is justified in addition to the Top Ten Percent
Law:
It is evident that if UT is to have diverse interactions, it needs more minority students who are interested in and meet the requirements for a
greater variety of colleges, not more students disproportionately enrolled
in certain programs. The holistic review endorsed by Grutter gives UT
219
that discretion . . . .

Essentially, the principle espoused here is that UT’s raceconscious policy is constitutionally justifiable to attain within-group
diversity among minority students, which yields the educational bene220
fits noted in Grutter. Judge Higginbotham’s statement that the Top
Ten Percent Law “places at risk UT’s race-conscious admissions poli221
cies” merely obscures this point and is off base. This also illustrates
the need for a coherent, well-articulated theory of critical mass that
222
explicitly includes within-group diversity.
Additionally, in the UT admissions system, the Top Ten Percent
Law serves largely to admit Black and Latina/o students from segre223
gated public schools.
UT could justify its race-conscious policy on
217
218

219
220
221
222
223

See supra Part I.C.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 240 (“While the [Top Ten Percent Law] may have contributed to an
increase in overall minority enrollment, those minority students remain clustered in certain programs, limiting the beneficial effects of educational diversity. For example, nearly a quarter of the undergraduate students in UT’s College of Social Work are Hispanic,
and more than 10% are African-American. In the College of Education, 22.4% of students are Hispanic and 10.1% are African-American. By contrast, in the College of Business Administration, only 14.5% of the students are Hispanic and 3.4% are AfricanAmerican.”).
Id.
See supra Parts I.C. and II.C. In its Supreme Court brief, UT makes a similar point. See
supra notes 183 and 281 and accompanying text.
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 243.
See supra Part I.C.
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Percentage plans depend for their effectiveness on continued racial segregation at the secondary
school level: They can ensure significant minority enrollment in universities only if the
majority-minority high school population is large enough to guarantee that, in many
schools, most of the students in the top 10% or 20% are minorities. Moreover, because
such plans link college admission to a single criterion—high school class rank—they create perverse incentives. They encourage parents to keep their children in lowperforming segregated schools, and discourage students from taking challenging classes
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grounds of within-group socioeconomic and demographic diversity—
to admit Black and Latina/o students from predominantly White
224
schools in more affluent districts. Not only would these students be
225
more competitive academically, but consistent with Grutter’s mandate, they would add diverse perspectives and experiences within the
Black and Latina/o student populations on campus. One common
stereotype of Black and Latina/o students is that all students from
these groups come from poor, inner-city backgrounds. If UT’s raceconscious policy did indeed target the noted population, then it
serves directly to break down this racial stereotype, and thus to help
226
attain the educational benefits of diversity noted in Grutter. Moreover, the race-conscious policy also adds to the overall diversity of
viewpoints on campus, as Black and Latina/o students from more
competitive, predominantly White schools have different experiences
and perspectives than their counterparts who gain admission through
the Top Ten Percent Law.
While there are many possible critiques of the Top Ten Percent
227
Law, it does not automatically impact the constitutionality of UT’s
race-conscious admissions policy merely because it increases the

224

225

226

227

that might lower their grade point averages.”); Jennifer L. Shea, Note, Percentage Plans:
An Inadequate Substitute for Affirmative Action In Higher Education Admissions, 78 IND. L.J.
587, 615 (2003) (“In Texas, one critic of the Texas Plan remarked that the ‘very success
[of the percentage plan] to produce a diverse student body depends on continuing the
de facto segregation of Texas high schools.’”).
At the Fifth Circuit, UT did not use this defense, focusing instead on critical mass at the
classroom level. It did, however, raise a similar point in its Supreme Court brief. See infra
note 281.
The Fifth Circuit panel acknowledged this point. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 240 n.149 (“[T]he
Top Ten Percent Law hurts academic selectivity: UT must admit a top ten percent student from a low-performing high school before admitting a more qualified minority student who ranks just below the top ten percent at a highly competitive high school.”).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319–20 (2003) (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among
minority students.”). UT raised this point in its Supreme Court brief. See infra note 281.
Another possible reason to have a mix of minority students from high and low socioeconomic backgrounds is that the former, who have often attended predominantly White
schools in affluent districts or elite, private schools, may help the latter adjust to elite,
predominantly White universities. This argument was raised by Shanta Driver, a lawyer
for the student intervenors in Grutter, at a debate on affirmative action shortly after the
Supreme Court’s Grutter ruling. Social science studies can investigate whether such an effect does indeed occur and bolster any arguments for within-group diversity by UT and
other institutions.
See, e.g., supra note 223 (arguing that percentage plans require continued segregation at
lower academic levels and create perverse incentives).
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228

number of minority students. As long as UT’s race-conscious policy
contributes to diversity in a unique manner, by admitting Black and
Latina/o students from different backgrounds and with different
viewpoints than those admitted via the Top Ten Percent Law, there is
no problem with its constitutionality. Nevertheless, Part V elaborates
further on how courts can evaluate the contribution of a raceconscious admissions policy, while also applying strict scrutiny rather
than the “good faith” standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit panel in
Fisher.
4. The Question of Different Racial Groups
There is another potential problem that can arise if courts try to
determine whether an institution has attained a critical mass: what if
a race-conscious policy is necessary for some groups but not others?
Fisher only dealt with numbers and percentages of Black and Latina/o
students, and the Fifth Circuit seemed to assume that if Black and Latina/o students had been sufficiently represented, then the use of
race would have been deemed entirely unconstitutional. However,
this position does not take into account Native Americans and other
groups. Even if there were sufficient numbers (and sufficient withingroup diversity) for Black and Latina/o students, UT could still potentially have justified its race-conscious policy for the purpose of
admitting greater numbers of Native American students, or any other
229
racial/ethnic group that is underrepresented.
Moreover, even if
the number of Native American students admitted via the raceconscious policy were very small, these students may still add different
perspectives and contribute to the educational benefits of diversity.
228

229

This Article does argue that the Top Ten Percent Law, or any other race-neutral policy
which is implemented and contributes significantly to racial diversity, may allow more
stringent review of a co-existing race-conscious admissions policy. See infra Part IV.C.2.
However, it would still be erroneous to say that the race-neutral policy automatically puts
the race-conscious policy in danger; that would only be true if the race-conscious policy
did not uniquely contribute to diversity above and beyond the race-neutral policy. See infra Part IV.C.2; see also infra Part V.C.1.
UT’s policy did not grant ex ante preference to any particular group. See supra note 151
(stating that “race can enhance the personal achievement score of a student from any racial background . . .”). However, it can be presumed, given the University’s arguments,
that its race-conscious policy primarily targeted Black and Latino students. Between 2007
and 2010, UT enrolled no more than twenty-six Native American students in any year,
and in 2010 the number was only thirteen. See Report 13: Implementation and Results of the
Texas Automatic Admissions Law (HB 588) at the University of Texas at Austin, OFFICE OF
ADMISSIONS AT THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN 8 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.utexas.edu/
student/ admissions/research/HB588-Report13.pdf (presenting a report on the demographic makeup of the top of 10% students entering the University of Texas).
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Although not raised in Fisher, this example raises some problems
with assessing critical mass that could occur in another case. Unlike a
point system (e.g., the policy rejected in Gratz), race-conscious policies in a holistic admissions system are not group-specific. Many different groups could contribute to the critical mass of perspectives
that actualizes the educational benefits of diversity. Using demographic data from one or two groups to determine the constitutionality of an entire race-conscious policy is problematic, as the policy
could affect enrollment of other groups that may still be underrepresented. It is quite possible that at least some Native American students were admitted under UT’s race-conscious admissions policy; yet
neither the parties nor the Fifth Circuit addressed the impact on these students if the race-conscious policy is struck down.
5. No Meaningful Standard for Judicial Review
As noted earlier in Part III.D.1, the Fisher panel’s treatment of critical mass was indistinguishable from a numerical goal. Moreover,
even if there is no such theoretical goal implicit in the Fifth Circuit’s
analysis of critical mass, and even if there were no problem with defining critical mass in terms of numbers, Chief Justice Jones’s criticism that the Fisher opinion offers no meaningful ground for judicial
230
review is valid.
The Fisher opinion did not provide any indication
regarding what would constitute a critical mass at the classroom level
or how a court would review whether this goal had been attained; it
merely deferred to UT. The panel noted that “[i]f a plaintiff produces evidence that calls into question a university’s good faith pursuit of those educational benefits [that diversity is designed to produce], its race-conscious admissions policies may be found
231
unconstitutional.” However, it held that there was “insufficient reason to doubt UT’s good faith conclusion that ‘the University still has
232
not reached a critical mass at the classroom level.’”
Regardless of
233
whether this was a valid result, it leads one to ask: 1. What would be
necessary, beyond the evidence presented by the Fisher plaintiffs, to
create sufficient doubt? and 2. If there were such doubt, how would a

230

231
232
233

See supra note 173 and accompanying text (“In another extension of Grutter, the panel
opinion’s approval of classroom ‘diversity’ offers no ground for serious judicial review of
a terminus of the racial preference policy.”).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 245 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 244.
This Article does not take a position on the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Fisher; it focuses on
providing an alternative basis for analyzing the case.
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court evaluate whether the race-conscious policy was, in fact, constitu234
These questions are particularly important given Justice
tional?
Kennedy’s concerns about deference to universities in his Grutter dis235
sent. The next two Parts take up these questions.
IV. THREE CATEGORIES FOR REVIEW: IMPLEMENTATION VS.
EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVE VS. NEED
As noted earlier, the appropriate standard of review—the level of
236
deference given to universities—was an issue of contention in Fisher.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent distinguished between
two categories of deference to universities, as he contended that the
Grutter majority confuses “deference to a university’s definition of its
educational objective [and] deference to the implementation of this
237
goal.” An analysis of Grutter and Fisher together suggests that there
are three separate categories of review when examining deference to
universities: 1. Review of the actual implementation of race-conscious
policies as implemented to insure they comply with Grutter’s requirements, which requires strict scrutiny; 2. Review of whether the university’s educational objective encompasses racial diversity (essentially,
whether the university has a compelling interest in diversity), which
requires only “good faith” on the part of the university; and 3. Review
of whether race-conscious admissions policies are needed to attain
this educational objective, which is the source of controversy in Fish238
er.
After delineating these three categories, this Part will focus on
the last one. Justice Kennedy’s view of this specific issue—how courts
should review whether a university needs to use race-conscious policies to attain its educational objective—will be key to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Fisher.

234
235

236
237
238

Part IV provides this Article’s proposed answers to these questions.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that
“[w]ere the courts to apply a searching standard to race-based admissions schemes, that
would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives.
[Which is preferable to] [t]he Court be[ing] satisfied by the Law School’s profession of
its own good faith”).
See supra Part III.C.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See Brief of Appellees at 43, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 0950822) (“The only dispute with regard to narrow tailoring . . . is whether UT has demonstrated a valid need for its policy.”).
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A. Review of the Implementation of a Race-Conscious Policy—Strict Scrutiny
The standard of review for race-conscious policies as implemented
is strict scrutiny: such policies must adhere to Grutter’s narrow tailor239
240
ing principles. The Grutter majority, the Fisher three judge panel,
241
Chief Judge Jones’s dissent to the Fisher en banc denial, and Justice
242
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent all agree here. As noted earlier, there are
commentators who argue that Grutter’s narrow tailoring test does not
243
equate with traditional notions of strict scrutiny, and Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent contended that the Grutter majority did not actually apply strict scrutiny when assessing the University of Michigan
244
Law School’s admissions policy.
Nevertheless, in theory, there is
agreement that strict scrutiny should be the standard of review for
the implementation of a race-conscious admissions policy.
B. Review of a University’s Educational Objective—“Good Faith”
The standard of review for a university’s educational objective—
whether a university has a compelling interest, given its educational
goals and mission, in pursuing racial diversity—is “good faith.” The
245
246
Grutter majority, the Fisher three judge panel, Chief Judge Jones’s
247
dissent to the Fisher en banc denial, and Justice Kennedy’s Grutter

239
240

241

242

243
244

245
246

247

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (“All government racial classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011) (“It is a given that as UT’s Grutter-like admissions program differentiates between applicants on the basis of race, it is
subject to strict scrutiny with its requirement of narrow tailoring.”).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting from the
denial of en banc rehearing) (“[T]he Court[‘s] . . . many holdings . . . have applied conventional strict scrutiny analysis to all racial classifications.”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“This Court has reaffirmed, subsequent
to Bakke, the absolute necessity of strict scrutiny when the State uses race as an operative
category.”).
See Ayres & Foster, supra note 84 (making a case that the Grutter decision is not an application of the traditional “least restrictive means” test for narrow tailoring).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . [in Grutter] . . . does not
apply strict scrutiny.”); id. at 389 (“The majority fails to confront the reality of how the
Law School’s admissions policy is implemented.”).
Id. at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word . . . [and] . . . presum[e] good faith of
university officials . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixedpoint system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university’s good
faith . . . .”).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301, 305 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting from
denial of en banc) (noting that a court “may presume a university’s good faith in the de-
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248

dissent all agree here also. Courts can presume on good faith that a
university has a compelling interest in the educational benefits of racial diversity and that the university’s goals and mission encompass
249
this interest.
C. Review of the Need for Race-Conscious Policy to Achieve a University’s
Educational Objective: The Question in Fisher
The standard of review for whether race-conscious policies are
needed to attain a university’s educational objective (i.e., its compelling interest in racial diversity) is a key issue as the Supreme Court
250
considers Fisher. The substantive question is whether race-conscious
policies are needed to attain the educational benefits of diversity, given that a race-neutral policy (the Top Ten Percent Law) has increased racial diversity. Is the standard of review a deferential, “good
faith” standard—as it is for whether the university has a compelling
interest in racial diversity itself—or is the question of need subject to
251
strict scrutiny, as the implementation of race-conscious policies is?
The level of judicial review with respect to need was a major point of
disagreement between the Fisher three judge panel and Chief Judge
252
Jones.
In her dissent to the denial of the Fisher en banc hearing,
Chief Judge Jones was extremely critical of the Fifth Circuit panel’s
deference to UT with respect to the need for race-conscious policies;
she claimed that such deference leaves no place for meaningful judi-

248

249

250

251

252

cision that it has a compelling interest in achieving racial and other student diversity. But
that is as about as far as deference should go”).
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In the context of university admissions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted . . . but deference is not to be given
with respect to the methods by which it is pursued.”). Justice Kennedy’s language here
suggests that he applies a deferential standard to reviewing a university’s educational
goals and compelling interest in seeking racial diversity.
See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“Universities . . . may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose.
So long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no
warrant for judicial interference in the academic process.”).
Justice Sotomayor raised this question in the Fisher oral arguments. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 1, at 49 (asking UT’s counsel “when do we stop deferring to the
University’s judgment that race is still necessary? That’s the bottom line of this case”).
The Fisher Plaintiffs advocated a “strong basis in evidence” standard to evaluate the need
for race-conscious admissions policies. See supra notes 193 and 195 and accompanying
text. The Fisher three judge panel rejected this standard. See supra note 197.
See supra Part III.A.4.
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253

cial review.
Chief Judge Jones stated that the Fisher three judge
panel abrogated strict scrutiny by replacing Grutter’s narrow tailoring
254
inquiry with a “good faith” standard, and contended that the “good
faith” standard applied to a university’s compelling interest in diversi255
ty, not to the need for race-conscious policies to attain this diversity.
Further, Chief Judge Jones criticized the Fisher panel for its conclusion that:
[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized
manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university’s good faith determination
that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority
256
enrollment.

Chief Judge Jones contended that “[t]his statement apparently
conflates the University’s compelling interest with narrow tailoring,
or at least it misleads as to the importance of each prong of strict
257
scrutiny analysis.”
A close reading of Grutter suggests otherwise: “The Court takes
the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than to
find a race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its use of
258
racial preferences as soon as practicable.”
This language implies
that the Supreme Court in Grutter gave “good faith” deference to the
University of Michigan Law School with respect to the need for raceconscious admissions policies. The Fisher three judge panel also in259
terpreted Grutter in this way.
Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court decides Fisher, Grutter’s
“good faith” deference may well not survive. As noted, Justice Ken-

253

254

255

256
257
258

259

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301, 307 (5th. Cir. 2011) (arguing “the panel opinion’s
approval of classroom ‘diversity’ offers no ground for serious judicial review of a terminus
of the racial preference policy”). See also supra note 173 and accompanying text.
See Fisher, 644 F.3d at 305 (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (“The Fisher panel opinion . . . supplants strict scrutiny with total deference to University administrators.” (footnote omitted)).
Id. at 305 n.3 (noting that a court “may presume a university’s good faith in the decision
that it has a compelling interest in achieving racial and other student diversity. But that is
as about as far as deference should go”).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011).
Fisher, 644 F.3d at 305.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309–10 (2003). This language—specifically “at its
word”—implies that the Supreme Court in Grutter gave “good faith” deference to the
University of Michigan Law School in determining the necessity of its race-conscious policies.
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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260

nedy was quite critical of this deference; it was his chief reason for
261
dissenting in Grutter. Although his Grutter dissent addressed “educational objective” and “implementation” rather than need for race262
conscious policies, it is likely that Justice Kennedy will apply a higher standard of review to assessing need than the Fifth Circuit panel
did.
However, there is another method to examine this issue which is
consistent with Grutter. The distinction between ex ante and ex post
deference is significant, in terms of the practicability of judicial review. Ex ante here refers to assessing the need for race-conscious policies before a race-neutral strategy has been tried and proven effective
in increasing diversity. Ex post, on the other hand, refers to the need
for such policies after a race neutral policy (such as the Top Ten Percent Law) has been implemented and proven successful in increasing
racial diversity: this is the case in Fisher. This Article argues that ex
post, it is more practical to apply a higher standard of review and give
less deference to universities.
1. Ex Ante Review with Respect to Need: “Good Faith”
It would be very difficult for a court to assess, ex ante, whether any
viable race-neutral alternative exists for enrolling a critical mass and
attaining the educational benefits of diversity. First, there are numerous potential admissions policies that might increase diversity in
one way or another, and Grutter stated that a university need not ex263
haust all race-neutral alternatives.
Second, as argued earlier, criti264
cal mass cannot be measured readily, and it would be difficult to
devise judicial standards to determine whether a university has attained a critical mass and the accompanying educational benefits of
diversity. This is why Grutter deferred to the “good faith” of universi-

260

261

262

263
264

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that “[d]eference is antithetical
to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it” and criticizing the Grutter majority for being “willing to be satisfied by the Law School’s profession of its own good faith”).
See id. at 395 (“If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the
use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in
pursuit of student diversity.”).
See id. at 388 (“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its educational
objective with deference to the implementation . . . .”). Kennedy’s dissent here addresses
the university educational objective and the “implementation” of its race-conscious policies, but not assessment of the need for race-conscious policies.
Id. at 339 (Opinion of the Court) (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative.”). Of course, Fisher could change this standard.
See supra Part I.C.3.
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ties on the issue of whether race-neutral admissions policies can ade265
quately replace race-conscious ones.
One could thus interpret Grutter as applying “good faith” deference to universities ex ante on the need for race-conscious admissions policies. However, Fisher fits into the ex post category, because a
race-neutral policy—the Top Ten Percent Law—is already in place at
UT.
2. Ex Post Review with Respect to Need: Strict Scrutiny
The ex post analysis—after a race-neutral policy has been implemented, as is the case in Fisher—is different. Here, a more stringent
266
level of judicial review is practical and consistent with Grutter.
A
court need not just consider the possibilities: it can instead assess the
efficacy of the implemented race-neutral policy and compare it to the
race-conscious policy being challenged. This can create a meaningful
standard by which courts can review the need for race-conscious ad267
missions policies. If an institution has already implemented a race-

265

266
267

Grutter actually noted that the Top Ten Percent Law and similar percentage plans are not
adequate substitutes for race-conscious policies, questioning “how such plans could work
for graduate and professional schools.” See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. However, the Texas
legislature had voluntarily adopted the Top Ten Percent Law, along with its consequences for academic selectivity and diversity. See supra Part III.A.1. Nevertheless, the Grutter
majority opinion also stated that such percentage plans compromise academic selectivity
and individualized review necessary to attain educational benefits of diversity. Id. (“‘Percentage plans,’ [which] . . . guarantee admission to all students above a certain class-rank
threshold in every high school in the State . . . may preclude the university from conducting the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not just
racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university . . .” and may
compel universities “to abandon the academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of [their]
educational mission.”). It remains to be seen whether these principles survive the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fisher.
Grutter did not make the ex ante/ex post distinction and thus did not address ex post review at all.
Courts can also review Plaintiffs’ claims that race-neutral policies would generate sufficient diversity, if those claims are supported by sufficient evidence, such as empirical data.
See infra Parts V.A. and V.C.1. Courts will still have to decide which race-neutral policies a
university can be judicially compelled to adopt, and which are overly burdensome on universities’ educational missions. See supra note 265. Hereinafter, race-neutral policies that
can be judicially compelled (because they are not overly burdensome on universities educational missions) will be referred to as “acceptable” race-neutral policies. The Supreme
Court’s ruling in Fisher may shed light on which race-neutral policies, if any, are “acceptable.” However, given that UT voluntarily implemented the Top Ten Percent Law (due to
legislative rather than judicial action), the immediate question in Fisher is not whether
universities can be compelled to adopt a percentage plan or other race-neutral policy, but
whether they can use race-conscious measures in addition to voluntarily-adopted raceneutral policies which have increased diversity.
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neutral policy to increase diversity, then a plaintiff can make the argument that such a policy has yielded sufficient diversity. The Fisher
Plaintiffs did this, by comparing percentages of Black and Latino students admitted prior to Hopwood and under the Top Ten Percent
Law, and also by comparing UT’s minority enrollment percentages
with those of the University of Michigan Law School at the time of
268
Grutter.
UT rebutted this claim by showing that diversity at the classroom
level was insufficient.
However, the Fifth Circuit did not require UT to demonstrate that
its race-conscious policy was the least restrictive means for attaining
sufficient diversity at the classroom level. The panel’s analysis did lay
out why the Top Ten Percent Law did not yield sufficient diversity—
because it disproportionately admitted minority students in certain
269
majors —but the panel did not require UT to show that its raceconscious admissions policy explicitly aimed to admit students who
were not admitted through the Top Ten Percent Law. The panel rejected any standard higher than “good faith” for reviewing UT’s deci270
sion to implement a race-conscious admissions policy.
Nevertheless, a more stringent standard is certainly possible and
practical. As noted in Part II.B.2, Professors Ian Ayres and Sydney
Foster argue that Grutter deviates from the traditional least restrictive
271
means standard of narrow tailoring. Their critique centered broadly on Grutter’s narrow tailoring requirements, but can also apply to
the Fifth Circuit’s review of the need for UT’s race-conscious admis272
sions policy in Fisher.
This Article argues that Grutter is consistent
with a higher level of scrutiny ex post for a race-conscious policy im273
plemented after a race-neutral policy has increased diversity.
The
Fifth Circuit could have required UT to demonstrate that its raceconscious policy actually made a unique contribution to diversity, beyond that obtained through the Top Ten Percent Law. If courts were
268
269
270

271
272
273

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Grutter teaches that so long as
a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a
quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university’s
good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve
the educational benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”). The Plaintiffs in Fisher had argued for a higher standard of review. See supra
notes 193, 195, and accompanying text.
Ayres & Foster, supra note 84.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 266–70 and accompanying text.
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going to enforce Grutter’s preference for race-neutral alternatives over
274
race-conscious admissions policies, a higher standard than “good
faith” would be necessary. The standard proposed is a goals-means fit
275
which is considered the hallmark of strict scrutiny.
276
Consistent with Justice Kennedy’s view, the next Part proposes
and lays out the “unique contribution to diversity” test, which focuses
on diversity within racial groups as a compelling interest and also
employs strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing the need for
race-conscious policies to attain this interest.
V. UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO DIVERSITY: APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY
IN FISHER
This Part presents an approach to Fisher that is less deferential to
universities than the Fifth Circuit opinion and applies strict scrutiny:
the “unique contribution to diversity” test. The purpose of this test is
to assess the underlying issue raised by Fisher—whether a raceconscious policy is necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity when a race-neutral policy is in place and has increased diversity. The “unique contribution to diversity” test builds upon the earlier analysis of diversity within racial groups and critical mass, but it
does not require a court to determine whether a critical mass of minority students is present, or to define “critical mass” precisely in any
specific numerical or other terms. Rather than attempting to determine whether a critical mass is present, the test focuses on whether
the race-conscious policy contributes uniquely to the educational
benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter.
A. Assessing Unique Contribution to Diversity Instead of Critical Mass
Building on the analysis of standard of review and the general discussion of within-group diversity, this Article argues that a court
could decide Fisher by assessing whether a race-conscious admissions
policy makes a unique, meaningful contribution to the educational
benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter, rather than trying to determine whether a critical mass of minority students is present at the
274
275
276

See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court
confuses deference to a university’s definition of its educational objective with deference
to implementation of this goal. In the context of university admissions the objective of
racial diversity can be accepted . . . but deference is not to be given with respect to the
methods by which it is pursued.”).
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277

classroom or campus level.
For example, in Fisher, after the Plaintiffs presented evidence that UT had obtained sufficient diversity via
the race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law, UT would have to articulate
how its race-conscious policy adds to the educational benefits beyond
the Top Ten Percent Law, and in a manner not practical via the Top
Ten Percent Law. UT could do this in at least two different ways.
1. Unique Contribution to Representation of Different Racial Groups
Although it was not addressed in Fisher, if UT were employing its
race-conscious policy to admit more Native American students or any
other underrepresented minority group, then that would show that
the policy is making a unique contribution to the educational benefits of diversity. UT would also have to show that the Top Ten Percent Law did not admit sufficient numbers of Native American students. This argument was not raised in Fisher, as both the Plaintiff
and UT focused on Black and Latina/o students; nevertheless, the
argument could be relevant in another case with similar facts.
2. Unique Contribution to Diversity Within Racial Groups
UT could also show that its race-conscious policy contributed to
diversity within racial groups, consistent with the educational benefits
of within-group diversity and the notion of critical mass advocated in
277

The “unique contribution to diversity” test articulated here could work for the Top Ten
Percent Law or for other race-neutral admissions policies that aim to increase diversity.
Other race-neutral policies that might increase diversity include: consideration of applicants’ socioeconomic background, first generation college status, “marked residential instability” (defined in terms of moving from residence to residence frequently while growing up), geographic residency, enrollment in low-performing schools, a guaranteed
percentile admission plan (i.e., Top Ten Percent Law), and admissions preference to all
students (regardless of the race) at a school based on the school’s socioeconomic or racial composition. See Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity in Postsecondary Education, DEP’T OF JUSTICE 7 (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/edu/documents/guidancepost.pdf [hereinafter Guidance] (discussing the Obama
administration’s recommendations for implementation of race-conscious admissions policies and race-neutral alternatives in higher education). The Guidance presumes these
policies are “race-neutral.” But see supra note 15 (noting that several commentators question whether percentage plans are actually “race-neutral”). Additionally, the Guidance
recommends that institutions document their compelling interests and unique educational missions and make records of race-neutral alternatives that are considered, along
with the reasons for rejecting those alternatives. See Guidance at 7. As noted earlier, Grutter held that universities cannot be compelled to adopt percentage plans such as the Top
Ten Percent Law as a substitute for race-conscious admissions policies. See supra notes
265 and 267. Nevertheless, courts may have to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether
universities have sufficient reason to reject other race-neutral alternatives.
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this Article. It could have argued that its race-conscious policy was
278
needed to attain more Black and Latino students in certain majors,
and presented evidence that the policy was actually used to admit
279
students in those majors. UT did in fact submit evidence conveying
the disparate enrollment of minority students in certain majors, although its argument focused solely on numbers at the classroom level
and did not convey the educational benefits of within-group diversity.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit did not predicate its ruling in Fisher on
any such showing of evidence, applying a deferential “good faith”
280
standard instead.
Alternatively, UT could have demonstrated that its race-conscious
policy contributed to socioeconomic, cultural, or geographic diversity
281
among Black and Latino students.
This would also show that the
race-conscious policy made a unique contribution to diversity—
perhaps by facilitating the admission of Black and Latino students
with different experiences and perspectives than students admitted
through the Top Ten Percent Law. If the policy allowed enrollment
of Black and Latino students from more competitive, affluent, predominantly White schools, then it would contribute to such withingroup diversity and thus to the educational benefits of diversity es282
poused in Grutter.
UT would also have to show that the Top Ten
Percent Law did not admit significant numbers of these students.
278

279

280
281

282

The advantage of an individualized, holistic, race-conscious policy is that it does allow
student majors and academic interests to be considered in admissions, and an admissions
committee can target those majors that are underrepresented. This would be more difficult with a non-individualized process, such as the Top Ten Percent Law. See Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 240 (5th Cir. 2011) (“While the [Top Ten Percent] Law may
have contributed to an increase in overall minority enrollment, those minority students
remain clustered in certain programs . . . .”).
One possible obstacle here is that many students switch majors after enrolling in college.
UT might also have to show that a significant percentage of students admitted on this basis actually remained in the given majors, so that classroom benefits of diversity are actualized.
See supra note 270.
This issue was not raised in Fisher at the district court or in the Fifth Circuit argument.
However, in its Supreme Court brief, UT did assert that Black and Latino students admitted under its race-conscious policy “have great potential for serving as a ‘bridge’ in promoting cross-racial understanding, as well as in breaking down racial stereotypes.” Brief
for Respondents at 34, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 11-345). Further, UT asserted,
“[p]etitioner’s position would forbid UT from considering . . . a [high-achieving, affluent
Black or Latino] student’s race in holistic review as well, even though admission of such a
student could help dispel stereotypical assumptions (which actually may be reinforced by
the top 10% plan) by increasing diversity within diversity.” Id. (emphasis in original).
See supra Parts I.C. and II.C. As noted earlier, one common stereotype of Black and Latino students is that all of these students come from poor, inner-city backgrounds, and if
UT’s race-conscious policy does indeed target the noted population, then it serves direct-
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UT could also demonstrate that its race-conscious policy contrib283
uted to within-group diversity in some other unique way. So long as
the educational benefits of diversity obtained by enrolling these students were consistent with those articulated in Grutter, and the group
of students targeted could not readily be admitted in sufficient numbers via the Top Ten Percent Law, the race-conscious policy would be
constitutional.
3. What Would be the Result in Fisher?
If the Supreme Court adopted the “unique contribution to diversity” test, it would vacate the Fifth Circuit ruling in Fisher, but it would
not declare UT’s race-conscious policy to be unconstitutional. Rather, it would remand the case for review based on the more stringent standard proposed here. The eventual result would be an open
question, dependent on UT’s ability to demonstrate that its raceconscious policy makes a unique contribution to diversity, above and
284
beyond the Top Ten Percent Law.
Consistent with strict scrutiny,
UT’s race-conscious policy would have to be narrowly tailored to fit
the compelling interest of attaining within-group diversity and its educational benefits.

283

284

ly to break down this racial stereotype and thus to help attain the educational benefits of
diversity noted in Grutter. See supra note 226.
For example, Professors Kevin Brown and Jeannine Bell advocate for universities to distinguish between different Black groups, such as Black immigrants (from Africa and the
Caribbean), multiracial persons, Black Latinos, and African Americans when implementing their race-conscious admissions policies. See Brown & Bell, supra note 7, at 1230–31.
Additionally, the Pew Hispanic Center has published reports detailing diversity within Latina/o populations in the U.S. See, e.g., Seth Motel & Eileen Patten, Hispanic Origin Profiles,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER,
June
27,
2012,
available
at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/06/27/country-of-origin-profiles/
(noting that
“[t]here are differences across [Latina/o] groups in the share of each that is foreign
born, holds citizenship (by birth or naturalization) and is proficient in English. They are
also of varying age, tend to live in different areas within the U.S. and have varying levels
of education, homeownership, income and poverty”). Similarly, the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (“AAPI”) has emphasized the significance
of diversity within AAPI groups. See also Arelis Hernandez, Spreading the Word on Asian
American Diversity, DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. (June 23, 2010),
http://diverseeducation.com/article/13904c4/spreading-the-word-on-asian-americandiversity.html (“For Kiran Ahuja, the executive director of the White House Initiative on
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPI), communicating an accurate picture of
Asian American diversity to policymakers across the federal government represents a
fundamental task . . . .”).
As noted earlier, UT does assert in its Supreme Court brief that its race-conscious policy
adds to diversity within racial groups. See supra notes 183 and 281. This Article argues,
however, that UT must go beyond mere assertion and actually demonstrate that it uses
race in a manner to actually attain within group diversity and its educational benefits.
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B. Limiting Principle on Race-Conscious Policies to Attain Diversity
One question left open by the “unique contribution to diversity”
test is what is the limiting principle on race-conscious policies to attain diversity? The test itself does not place an upper limit on the use
of race-conscious admissions policies, because there are an infinite
number of diverse viewpoints. In theory, a university could always use
race to admit students with different viewpoints, even if vast racial
and within-group diversity already exists within the admitted class of
285
students. What then is the limiting principle for the use of race?
There are at least two possible answers to that question: 1. The
point of diminishing return for the educational benefits of diversity;
and 2. The overall, aggregate weight given to race in the admissions
process. Although both are generally consistent with Grutter, the latter makes more sense in light of the issues raised in this Article.
1. Point of Diminishing Returns for the Educational Benefits of Diversity
Inclusion of more diverse perspectives can always add to the educational experience. However, there are diminishing returns to educational benefits of diversity. Given the time and space constraints,
students cannot experience all perspectives and educational opportunities that might be available in classrooms and on campuses more
generally. As noted earlier in Part II, race-conscious policies have
costs. At some point, the stigmatic harm and other costs associated
with race-conscious admissions policies begin to outweigh any additional benefits of diversity—and one interpretation of Grutter is that
286
beyond this point, it does not allow further consideration of race.
While this analysis is logically consistent with the theory of Grutter
articulated in this Article, it runs into a practical problem. It would
be no easier for a court to determine the point of diminishing returns for the educational benefits of diversity than it would to deter287
mine if a critical mass is present; either determination is highly sub285
286

287

See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (rejecting “racebased decisionmaking [that is] essentially limitless . . . .”).
Cf. Ayres & Foster, supra note 84 (arguing that courts should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of race-conscious admission policies). This Article does not contend that the Grutter
majority itself viewed critical mass in terms of such a cost-benefit analysis. Rather, the
contention here is that the diversity/stigmatic harm calculus noted here can be inferred
from Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles and its notion of “critical mass.”
In one sense, determining the point of critical mass is the same as determining the point
of diminishing returns for the educational benefits of diversity. When there is a critical
mass present, enrolled through the type of admissions process that Grutter envisions, the
educational benefits of diversity (racial and within-group) can outweigh, by the greatest
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jective and context-dependent. Moreover, Grutter has other provisions which may be more practical and may also create a lower bound
for the use of race-conscious policies—by limiting the weight that can
be placed on race in the admissions process.
2. Aggregate Weight of Race in Admissions
Regardless of the educational benefits of diversity, there may be
an upper limit on race-conscious admissions policies based on the total aggregate weight that can be given to race in the admissions process. Since Grutter mandates that race be used in a flexible, non288
mechanical fashion, based on individualized review, there is no systematic weight of race for individual applicants in a constitutional,
holistic admissions plan. However, the weight of race in aggregate—
289
for all applicants in a given admissions cycle—can be measured,
and this aggregate weight can be compared to a designated limit that
is determined by courts. Two provisions in Grutter suggest that there
is such a limit. First, the Grutter majority opinion notes that
“[n]arrow tailoring . . . requires that a race-conscious admissions pro290
gram not unduly harm members of any racial group.”
While this

288
289

290

extent possible, the stigmatic harms, reinforcement of stereotypes, and other costs created by race-conscious policies necessary to attain that diversity. In this way, one can think
of Grutter’s critical mass concept and narrow tailoring requirements as joint provisions to
maximize the breakdown of racial stereotypes and promote cross-racial understanding—
taking into account both the educational benefits of diversity and the costs of raceconscious policies.
See supra Part II.B.1.
In Grutter, the Plaintiffs made an argument based on the aggregate weight of race in the
admissions process. The Grutter Plaintiffs used data on the undergraduate GPAs and Law
School Admissions Test (“LSAT”) scores of accepted and rejected applicants to the University of Michigan School from 1995 to 2000, all sorted by race, and calculated the odds
of acceptance for members of each group. Part of the basis for their argument was that
after statistically controlling for academic criteria and other variables, Black, Latino, and
Native American applicants had a much higher probability of being accepted to the Law
School than White and Asian American applicants. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp.
2d 821, 838–39 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (Plaintiffs’ expert witness concluding “that ‘[a]ll the
graphs comparing Native American, African American, Mexican American, and Puerto
Rican applicants to Caucasian American applicants show wide separation indicating a
much higher probability of acceptance for the particular ethnic group at a given selection
index value’”). But see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of
Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002) (“In any admissions process
where applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish the odds of admission facing white applicants.” (cited in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
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provision could be interpreted to limit the weight placed on race,
Grutter held that “in the context of its individualized inquiry into the
possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the [University of
Michigan’s] Law School’s race-conscious admissions program does
292
not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”
If the Supreme Court
follows this standard in Fisher, then undue burden will not be an issue: all parties concede that the weight given to race in UT undergraduate admissions is less than that upheld in Grutter for the Univer293
sity of Michigan Law School admissions program.
Second, and perhaps more important when Fisher goes before the
Court and particularly Justice Kennedy, race cannot be the “predominant” factor in the admission of any applicants. As Justice Kennedy
stated in his Grutter dissent:
There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as
one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity, but an educational institution must ensure . . . that race does not become a predomi294
nant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.

Nevertheless, while noting that a weight requirement could be
295
read into Grutter’s individualized consideration requirement, Professors Ayres and Foster contend that “the Grutter Court failed to offer
a theory for where the line should be drawn between programs that
296
weight race too heavily and those that do not.”
This Article agrees that the allowable weight given to race, in aggregate, needs to be clarified to provide a limiting principle for Grutter-like admissions plans. A full consideration of the aggregate weight
of race in a holistic admissions process is beyond the scope of this Ar291

292
293

294

295
296

See Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 558 (contending that “evidence that the Grutter Court
viewed the weight inquiry to be part of the individualized consideration inquiry comes in
its discussion of the requirement that the affirmative action plan not unduly burden third
parties”). Ayres and Foster further note that “the no-undue-burden requirement [is] . . .
a requirement that is related to the weight given to race in admissions . . . .” Id.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
See Brief of Appellees at 18, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (2012) (noting that
“UT’s holistic consideration of race is even more modest than the policy upheld in Grutter”). See also Fisher v. Texas, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that “UT
considers race in its admissions process as a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also supra Part I.C.1. (arguing
that perhaps the University of Michigan Law School could not admit more Native American applicants without making race the predominant factor in admissions).
See Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 558.
Id. Judge Garza’s dissent in Fisher also contends that the weight of race preferences is a
necessary element for meaningful judicial review. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 251 (Garza, J.,
specially concurring) (noting that in Grutter, “the weight given to race as part of this individualized consideration is purposefully left undefined, making meaningful judicial review all but impossible”).
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ticle. Moreover, although the Supreme Court could address this issue if it revisits Grutter, it is not the immediate issue at play in Fisher
itself: all parties concede that the weight given to race in UT undergraduate admissions is less than that upheld in Grutter for the Univer298
sity of Michigan Law School admissions program. The purpose of
the discussion here is just to show how an upper bound on the aggregate weight of race in an admissions process can be a limiting principle for the “unique contribution to diversity” test, and for race299
conscious admissions more generally.
C. Advantages of a “Unique Contribution to Diversity” Test
The “unique contribution to diversity” test described here has several advantages over a direct assessment of “critical mass.” It directly
addresses the critiques of the Grutter majority presented in Justice
Kennedy’s dissent and the critiques of the Fisher panel opinion pre300
sented in Chief Judge Jones’s dissent, and it also helps to resolve
other dilemmas faced by judges and advocates trying to interpret and
apply Grutter.
1. Ground for Judicial Review and Application of Strict Scrutiny
The “unique contribution to diversity” test directly addresses Justice Kennedy’s concern, raised in his Grutter dissent, that:
“[C]ourts . . . apply a searching standard to race-based admissions
schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives [rather than] . . . be satisfied by . . .
301
profession of its . . . ‘good faith.’” It also quells Chief Judge Jones’s
critique by offering “ground for serious judicial review of terminus of
302
the racial preference policy.” The test articulated requires a precise
fit between goals and means—characteristic of strict scrutiny. UT or
297
298
299

300
301

302

The Grutter Plaintiffs’ argument, supra note 285, provides some indication of how aggregate weight of race might be measured, notwithstanding Professor Liu’s critique.
See supra note 293.
An upper bound on the aggregate weight of race could also be useful in gradually phasing out race-conscious policies. Plaintiffs in future cases could argue for reduction of the
allowable upper bound, based on demographic changes, development of race-neutral
admissions strategies, or other developments that increase minority enrollment. See infra
Part V.C.3.
See supra notes 169–71.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. (noting the
“necessity for scrutiny that is real, not feigned, where the . . . category of race is a factor in
decisionmaking”).
Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, C.J., dissenting).

Nov. 2012]

DIVERSITY WITHIN RACIAL GROUPS

531

another university could not just claim that underrepresentation of
minorities in particular majors justifies its race-conscious policy; it
would have to show that the race-conscious policy in question actually
targets and admits minority students in those given majors. The same
would be true if the university contended that the race-conscious policy contributed to within-group socioeconomic or geographic diversi303
ty.
The proposal here balances various interests, giving universities
freedom to pursue different admissions strategies, which use race in
accordance with Grutter’s provisions, while also holding them accountable to Grutter’s preference for race-neutral admissions policies.
In doing so, it adopts a standard of review similar in stringency to that
304
advocated by the Fisher plaintiffs. However, unlike the “strong basis
in evidence” standard, which is a “backward-looking attempt to rem305
edy past wrongs,” the “unique contribution to diversity” test focuses
on “working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversi306
ty that provides the purported benefits.”
The test applies strict
scrutiny to review the need for race-conscious policies to attain diversity when a race-neutral policy has been or could be effective in increasing diversity. It requires a university to demonstrate the utility of
a race-conscious policy if: 1. A race-neutral policy is in place that significantly increases diversity; or 2. A plaintiff provides sufficient evidence that an acceptable race-neutral policy would result in levels of
307
diversity comparable to the race-conscious policy in question.
“Good faith” would apply only when there is not sufficient evidence

303

304
305
306
307

Of course, students often change majors while in college, and this could provide a basis
for counterargument. Socioeconomic and geographic diversity within racial groups are
not malleable after admission in this way and thus might be more viable bases for raceconscious policies.
See supra notes 193–92 and accompanying text.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 705 (2007).
Such evidence might be data that convincingly shows how an acceptable race-neutral policy would increase diversity at a particular institution. The reason to allow such evidence
to invoke more stringent review is to ensure that universities have incentive to explore
race-neutral alternatives to their race-conscious admissions policies—a particular concern
of Justice Kennedy. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Were the courts to apply a searching standard to race-based admissions
schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives.”). However, courts would still have to determine which race-neutral policies are
acceptable and do not overly compromise universities’ educational missions. See supra
notes 265 and 267. In the absence of convincing evidence that an acceptable race-neutral
policy would produce sufficient diversity, courts would accept universities’ “good faith”
determination that race-conscious policies are necessary, as dictated by Grutter.
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presented to raise a question about the need for race-conscious poli308
cies to attain the educational benefits of diversity.
Additionally, while the “unique contribution to diversity” test requires a goals-means fit for race-conscious admissions policies, it does
not place an overwhelming burden on universities to accomplish this
end. Institutions of higher education have or can readily obtain all of
the data necessary to demonstrate how their race-conscious policies
contribute to the educational benefits of diversity. Colleges and universities may need to collect more demographic data on diversity
within racial groups, and also to structure their race-conscious admissions policies more carefully to make sure those policies make a
“unique contribution to diversity.” However, there is no barrier that
309
would prevent these institutions from readily doing so.
2. Assessing the Unique (Even if Minimal) Impact of Race-Conscious
Policies
The “unique contribution to diversity” test also addresses Chief
Judge Jones’s contention that the race-conscious policy has a minimal
310
impact; in fact, the test focuses on whether the race-conscious policy does have a meaningful, unique impact. It is possible that a raceconscious policy that admits only a small number of minority students
can have a meaningful, unique impact if those students add to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences in a manner beyond the race311
neutral policy.
The admission of even small numbers of African
308

309

310
311

In such a case, a court would only review if the race-conscious policy conformed to Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles; it would presume “good faith” on the university’s part regarding the need for the race-conscious policy.
These measures may cause institutions to incur more costs, but colleges and universities
have adjusted to similar circumstances in the past: after Grutter, institutions had to expend more resources on holistic admissions and eliminate more cost-effective point systems similar to the one struck down in Gratz. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275
(2003) (“Respondents contend that ‘[t]he volume of applications and the presentation of
applicant information make it impractical for [LSA] to use the . . . admissions system’
upheld by the Court today in Grutter . . . But the fact that the implementation of a program capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative
challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.” (internal citation omitted)).
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
In its Supreme Court brief, UT also argued that “[t]he nuanced and modest impact of
race under UT’s holistic review plan is . . . a constitutional virtue, not a vice.” Brief for
Respondents at 36, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F. 3d 213, (2011) (No. 11-345). Additionally, during the Fisher oral argument, Justice Kennedy noted that he “had trouble with”
the Plaintiffs’ argument “that the University’s race-conscious admission plan is not necessary . . . because it admits . . . so few minorities.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
1, at 22. But see Ayres & Foster, supra note 84, at 523 n.27 (“At least as a theoretical mat-
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American and Latina/o students from certain majors, or from more
competitive schools, would be justifiable if minority students in those
majors were not admitted sufficiently via the Top Ten Percent Law, as
would the admission of small numbers of Native American students
via a race-conscious admissions policy.
3. Proper Application of Grutter’s “Sunset” Requirement
The “unique contribution to diversity” test also provides a reasonable path to apply Grutter’s sunset provision and eventually phase out
312
race-conscious admissions policies. The Fisher litigation and ruling
seemed to presume that once a particular critical mass is attained, a
university would immediately have to stop using race-conscious admissions policies. Grutter stated that institutions should periodically
review whether race-conscious admissions policies are necessary, with
the goal of phasing them out in favor of race-neutral alternatives to
313
attain diversity. However, this cannot occur all at once when a par-

312

313

ter, narrow tailoring requires not only that preferences not be too large, but also that they
not be too small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government
interest.”). Professors Ayres and Foster’s contention does not apply to race-conscious
admissions policies in higher education for two reasons: 1. Even a small increase in diversity could have meaningful educational benefits; 2. Having one or two students from a
given racial group may be significantly better than having none—particularly if those students are vocal in class or active on campus. In his Constitutional Law course at NYU
Law, Professor Derrick Bell jokingly referred to Turquoise Young, a Black female student
who always voiced her opinions, as a “critical mass of one.” Professor Bell noted that in
some of his classes, one or two vocal students had a tremendous impact on class discussions—although he acknowledged that this did not always happen. The variable and unpredictable nature of classroom dynamics is another reason why critical mass is difficult to
measure. See supra Part I.C.3. 2. As a practical matter, in a holistic admissions system that
is in compliance with Grutter (i.e., which uses race as a flexible, unquantified plus factor),
such minimal use of race would be difficult to detect. Cf. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I.
Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1146 (2008) (raising “the question of whether race can in fact be eliminated from admissions processes”); Daniel N.
Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Management At UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 1015 (2007)
(noting that “the line between race-based and race-blind policy making can be quite blurry”). There is no way to completely eliminate race from a holistic admissions process, as
information about an applicant’s race may be present throughout the application via personal statements, student group membership, and even names which are correlated with
group membership. In a “race-neutral” legal regime, plaintiffs might be able to prove
significant use of race with statistics, but they would have a very difficult time proving or
even detecting minimal usage.
This point also addresses Chief Justice Roberts’s question during the Fisher oral argument
at the Supreme Court about the “logical end point” of race-conscious admissions policies.
See supra note 172.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003). (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time . . . [i]n the context of higher education, the durational require-
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ticular critical mass is attained; in fact, this Article has argued that
neither courts nor universities can precisely define critical mass or
314
determine when a critical mass is present. Rather, the implementation of race-neutral alternatives should be an incremental process.
Grutter’s “sunset” requirement is best interpreted to require a gradual
reduction of race-conscious policies in favor of race-neutral admis315
sion policies “as they develop.” The “unique contribution to diversity” test provides a means for universities to gradually phase out use
of race in admissions, and for courts to review this process as necessary. Eventually, this process would lead to the elimination of raceconscious policies altogether, as espoused by Grutter, and the test articulated here provides a means for universities and for courts to assess, at any given time, to what extent their race-conscious policies are
necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity.
4. Continued Constitutional Viability of Race-Conscious Admissions
Policies
Although the “unique contribution to diversity” test holds universities to a more stringent standard to justify their use of race than the
Fifth Circuit’s “good faith” standard, it will allow race-conscious admissions policies to be constitutionally viable for longer. The Supreme Court is likely to narrow Grutter’s doctrine on race-conscious
316
admissions, and the “unique contribution to diversity” test allows
for this without compromising the enrollment of minority students.
This is probably the best that proponents of affirmative action can
317
hope for on the current Supreme Court.

314
315

316
317

ment can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student
body diversity.”).
See supra Part I.C.3.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“Universities . . . can and should draw on the most promising
aspects of . . . race-neutral alternatives as they develop.”). This also reinforces the point
in Part V.C.2 that race-conscious policies with a small impact can still be constitutional:
one would expect a gradual reduction in the use of these policies if indeed universities
are seeking to apply race-neutral alternatives.
See supra note 7.
Professor Derrick Bell used to warn students in his Constitutional Law course not to “let
the perfect be the enemy of the good.” For advocates of affirmative action, the proposal
in this Article is certainly not perfect, but compared to overturning Grutter altogether, it is
good.
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5. Highlighting Justice Kennedy’s Values Conflict: Predicating Diversity
on Segregation
Finally, the “unique contribution to diversity” test can address an
ironic twist in Fisher—one that speaks to a values conflict in Justice
Kennedy’s jurisprudence and in American society more generally. In
Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized the educational benefits of diversity as a compelling interest, and even in dissent, Justice Kennedy
318
recognized this interest and reiterated it in Parents Involved in Com319
Additionally, in Parents
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.
Involved, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence noted that “[a] compelling
320
interest exists in avoiding racial isolation,” —a notion that would
321
presumably be joined by four other Justices. If in Fisher, the Court
precludes UT from using race-conscious admissions, it would essentially be saying that the Top Ten Percent Law—a policy that increases
minority representation only because of racial isolation in Texas pub322
lic high schools —prevents UT from using race to pursue the educational benefits of diversity.
This would be an ironic and unfortunate result. The “unique
contribution to diversity” test allows Justice Kennedy to impose strict
323
scrutiny—thus satisfying his misgivings in Grutter —while still preserving UT’s ability to use narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions policies.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed and elaborated upon the role of diversity
within racial groups in determining the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions policies. It has done so in the context of Grutter
and Fisher, with an eye towards Justice Kennedy’s impending vote in
the latter. The theory of critical mass presented here reflects the
318

319

320
321
322
323

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387–88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our precedents provide a basis for
the Court’s acceptance of a university’s considered judgment that racial diversity among
students can further its educational task . . . .” ).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 791 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“As the Court notes, we recognized the compelling nature of the
interest in . . . diversity in higher education in Grutter.”).
Id. at 797.
Justice Kagan recused herself in Fisher, but she along with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor would likely agree with Justice Kennedy here. See supra note 3.
See supra note 223.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the Court abdicates its constitutional
duty to give strict scrutiny to the use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in pursuit of student diversity.”).
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compelling interest of breaking down racial stereotypes that is articulated in Grutter, and that logically coheres with Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles and the need for deference to universities. By analyzing these issues, this Article explicates the principle that raceconscious admissions policies can aim not only to increase representation of particular groups of minority students, but also to attain diversity with racial groups.
Further, in its analysis of Fisher, this Article addresses the scope of
deference given to universities with respect to race-conscious admissions policies. It distinguishes deference on three issues: implementation, educational objective, and need, and delineates how standards
of review are different for each. The Article builds upon its earlier
analysis of critical mass to propose a tangible test for courts to evaluate the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies when
race-neutral alternatives are in place, or when a plaintiff convincingly
demonstrates that acceptable race neutral policies may work as well as
race-conscious policies. The “unique contribution to diversity” test
proposed here focuses not on whether a critical mass is present on
campus or in particular classrooms; rather, it centers more immediately on whether the race-conscious policy in question makes a tangible, meaningful contribution to the diversity of perspectives and experiences on campus, beyond the race-neutral policies that are in
place. This test addresses the issues raised by Justice Kennedy in his
Grutter dissent and the critiques of Fisher posed by Chief Judge Jones
324
in her dissent to the en banc denial. The “unique contribution to
diversity” test also provides an interpretation of Grutter that allows
strict scrutiny rather than “good faith” to apply in a case like Fisher.
Finally, this Article highlights the values conflict in Fisher—the
problem of predicating campus diversity on school segregation
through the Top Ten Percent Law. This conflict will be one that Justice Kennedy will grapple with when determining his vote in Fisher. It
is also one aspect of a larger contradiction in America: the desire for
an anti-essentialist, colorblind society without the will to tangibly address the rampant racial inequalities that exist in this country. Affirmative action in higher education is just one small manifestation of
this dilemma, which is certain to appear again and again in American
law and politics. It would be an ironic and unfortunate twist if the
Court were to rule in a manner that predicates diversity in higher education on racial segregation in K-12 schooling, which has actually
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See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
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been increasing for the past twenty-five years. But more immediately, it is important to highlight this conflict in Justice Kennedy’s own
326
jurisprudence, as he will likely cast the deciding vote.
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See, e.g., Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Historical Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and
the Need for New Integration Strategies, A Report of the Civil Rights Project/Proyecto
Derechos Civiles, UCLA (2007), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-acceleratingresegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversalsaccelerating.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
See Gerken, supra note 6, for an excellent analysis of Justice Kennedy’s evolving race and
equal protection jurisprudence.

